著者

森 巧

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.3, pp.30-34, 2022-07-31 (Released:2022-08-10)

参考文献数

3

著者

森 巧

出版者

東洋文庫

雑誌

東洋学報 = The Toyo Gakuho (ISSN:03869067)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.101, no.1, pp.1-30, 2019-06

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The present article examines how the Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo 中華民國; ROC) attempted to reform its foreign affairs sector under its plan to counterattack the mainland during the 1950s, in order to discover the background against which the ROC regime became internationally isolated from the 1970s on. One important factor cited by the research to date as to why the ROC government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek was able to represent China on the world scene was the political acumen of the ROC diplomatic corps which continued to serve the regime since its mainland days. Then, as the ROC’s foreign policy tended more and more to stress the One China principle (hanzei buliangli 漢賊不兩立), the influence of those diplomats in policy-making waned, leading to the ROC’s international isolation.Here, the author challenges such an argument by the tracing the process in which the intervention of the Kuomintang Party and the military expanded in foreign affairs within reforms conducted throughout the foreign policy establishment during the 1950s under the implementation of the “Recover Mainland China Plan,” surmising that those reforms were part of a bolstering of what had been loosely termed the area of “oversea struggle affairs” (haiwai gongzuo 海外工作). Given such a state of affairs, the author takes up the specific case of the setting up of the Liaison Committee for Overseas Struggle Affairs (Haiwaiduifei Douzhenggongzuo Tongyizhidao Weiyuanhui 海外對匪闘争工作統一指導委員會) under the reforms.Based the idea of a “united front,” which predated the first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-55, oversea struggle affairs were continuously expanded during the post-crisis years aiming at counterattacking the mainland. The Overseas Struggle Operations Team (Haiwai Gongzuo Zhidao Xiaozu 海外工作指導小組) set up around the Kuomintang in 1953 and the Liaison Committee set up in 1957 by military intelligence both formed the leadership in oversea struggle affairs, through which the Kuomintang and the military continued to intervene in diplomatic affairs during the post-crisis era, even after the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. The author’s analysis shows that such intervention, which resulted in two phases of institutional reforms, expanded under the guise of conducting oversea struggle affairs aiming at counterattacking the mainland. Then from the 1960s on, similar intervention by other agencies caused a weakening of the position of professional diplomats in international affairs, leading to the ROC’s political isolation from the world scene during the 1970s.