著者
浜田 道夫
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.4, pp.381-400, 2002-11-25

In the France the Old Regime, the monarchy gave the nobility the exclusive privilege of hunting and bearing arms; the commoners, especially the peasants, opposed thid monopoly by poaching. The object of this paper is to examine the nature of seigneurial authority through investigating the repression of poaching in several jurisdictions. The poachers who appear in the criminal records tend to be fairly rich peasants (or their sons and young servants) using guns, which circulated among peasants in the countryside through both purchase and loans. This shows that hunting was rather commonplace as a leisure pursuit, although only a few records of proceedings against poaching can be found (only twenty-five in five jurisdictions throughout the eighteenth century). But why are there so few records of proceedings? First, it was because le garde de chasse (the rural police) were recruited from among the peasants and often chose not to pursue poachers; and second, because the seigneurial prosecutor proceeded principally against habitual poachers. There was certainly a threshold of tolerance in the seigneurial justice system. Thus the system served to mediate between the monarch, who needed to maintain order, and the peasants, who had been accustomed to hunting since the middle ages.
著者
浜田 道夫
出版者
社会経済史学会
雑誌
社會經濟史學 (ISSN:00380113)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.64, no.4, pp.461-491, 1998-11-25

In order to understand the characteristics of French absolutism, it is important to examine the seigneurial justice system. The object of this ARTICLE is investigate various aspects of seigneurial justice as it functioned in the Beaujolais region. The judicial documents show that in the majority of cases, criminal proceedings did not reach the final judgment stage, suggesting that most conflicts were resolved outside the official system. There were two methods of unofficial resolution: reconciliation of the two parties through mediation by priests, notaries or notables, and private acts of revenge by the aggrieved party. These practices had deep roots in the traditional norms of the peasant community. Conflicts were seen to belong to a private realm, beyond the reach of outside authority, and therefore to be solved by the local inhabitants themselves. Even seigneurial justice could not exercise a great influence on the local community. In fact, seigneurial justice did not function efficiently in conjunction with royal justice either. It is true that the long dispute over jurisdiction between the seigneurs and the monarch came to an end with the beginning of the eighteenth century, when seigneurial justice was incorporated into the royal justice system as the court of the first instance. This meant that officers of the royal courts also functioned as offices of the seigneurial courts, and that the seigneurial courts could make use of facilities of the royal courts such as prisons and law courts. Back up from the royal justice system was particularly valuable when it came to the prosecution of serious crimes. But problems remained. There is evidence of criminal proceedings being abandoned half-way through in order to save costs. Seigneurs of the eighteenth century were no longer willing to insist on their right to administer justice to the extent of shouldering the costs of expensive lawsuits. In other words, it would be wrong to overestimate the power of the seigneurial justice system, limited as it was both by the traditional norms of peasant communities and by the desire to reduce judicial costs.