著者
濵田 洋輔
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, pp.233-246, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

This paper aims to contribute to the research into the philosophy̶in particular, the ethics̶of Arnold Gehlen: one of the most famous representatives of “philosophical anthropology.” At the same time, it endeavors to make a contribution, albeit slight, to ethics in general by critically analyzing his ethics. Because the meaning and problems of Gehlen’s ethics cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the main point of his philosophical anthropology̶that is, his fundamental view of the human being̶this paper first discusses this view and then proceeds to explore his ethics. In the first part, I explain Gehlen’s belief that, unlike all other species, the human being is independent from(almost)all biological instincts and is consequently the totally cultural(non-biological)being. In this part, I also explain that this belief cannot be supported from the perspective of modern biology(evolutionary theory). In the second part, I illuminate that, in contradiction to his fundamental view of man, Gehlen’s pluralistic ethics takes biological components into consideration. I demonstrate at the same time that, besides this theoretically problematic contradiction, there are many other problems in his ethics: unclear and inconsistent explanations of four fundamental moral principles, contradictory arguments about the sharp antagonism between the moral principle of institution(state)and the morality of the Enlightenment(which promotes some other moral principles), etc. Finally, I argue that, in spite of all these problems, Gehlen’s ethics has at least one advantage over the ethics of philosophers such as Habermas and Honneth, who criticize his ethics on many points: in contrast to the latter ethics, Gehlen’s ethics admits and is open to a certain meaning of biological(evolutionary)elements in our social and moral life̶a meaning that seems to be undeniable in light of modern biology(modern evolutionary theory).
著者
濵田 洋輔
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.69, pp.145-159, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

Although Ernst Cassirer’s concern is primarily focused on epistemology, he wrote several texts on the history of ethics(especially classical German ethics). He also emphasizes that ethics plays a central role in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, a philosopher whom he greatly respected. Furthermore, the later Cassirer─as a Jew in exile from Nazi Germany─came to assert that a new construction of ethics that can be effective against real social problems is an inevitable philosophical task for his day. However, he did not produce any work explicating his own system of ethics. Why? Beginning with this question, I demonstrate that Cassirer, nevertheless, laid the fundamental foundation of his(unwritten)ethics by widening the application field of Kantian “moral freedom” and that this foundation can be formulated as follows: in order to combat mythical consciousness( symbolic form), which is the only ethical(and social)danger in human life, man must use and promote other kinds of consciousness(symbolic form), such as religious, artistic, linguistic, or scientific consciousness. I then point out some possible problems with this ethical foundation such as the inconsistent variation in his explanations of mythical consciousness in order to directly and exclusively relate the danger of this consciousness to the problems of Nazi Germany; the optimistic view that all types of human consciousness, except for mythical, are morally good; and the lack of serious consideration for actual and concrete social problems or biological and animal elements in human life. Finally, I indicate that what we could learn from these(possible)problems and Cassirer’s attitude toward ethics is, broadly speaking, as follows: we should remind ourselves that one of philosophy’s key tasks is to construct ethics that is effective against real social problems; furthermore, it would not be easy to satisfactorily fulfill this task if one is not prepared in advance or does not take into consideration the real and concrete lives and tangible problems of human existence seriously.
著者
濵田 洋輔
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.69, pp.145-159, 2020

Although Ernst Cassirer's concern is primarily focused on epistemology, hewrote several texts on the history of ethics(especially classical German ethics).He also emphasizes that ethics plays a central role in Immanuel Kant's philosophy,a philosopher whom he greatly respected. Furthermore, the later Cassirer─as a Jew in exile from Nazi Germany─came to assert that a new construction ofethics that can be effective against real social problems is an inevitable philosophicaltask for his day. However, he did not produce any work explicating hisown system of ethics. Why? Beginning with this question, I demonstrate thatCassirer, nevertheless, laid the fundamental foundation of his(unwritten)ethicsby widening the application field of Kantian "moral freedom" and that thisfoundation can be formulated as follows: in order to combat mythical consciousness(symbolic form), which is the only ethical(and social)danger in humanlife, man must use and promote other kinds of consciousness(symbolic form),such as religious, artistic, linguistic, or scientific consciousness. I then point outsome possible problems with this ethical foundation such as the inconsistentvariation in his explanations of mythical consciousness in order to directly andexclusively relate the danger of this consciousness to the problems of Nazi Germany;the optimistic view that all types of human consciousness, except formythical, are morally good; and the lack of serious consideration for actual andconcrete social problems or biological and animal elements in human life. Finally,I indicate that what we could learn from these(possible)problems and Cassirer'sattitude toward ethics is, broadly speaking, as follows: we should remindourselves that one of philosophy's key tasks is to construct ethics that is effectiveagainst real social problems; furthermore, it would not be easy to satisfactorilyfulfill this task if one is not prepared in advance or does not take intoconsideration the real and concrete lives and tangible problems of human existenceseriously.
著者
濵田 洋輔
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, pp.233-246, 2018

This paper aims to contribute to the research into the philosophy̶in particular, the ethics̶of Arnold Gehlen: one of the most famous representatives of "philosophical anthropology." At the same time, it endeavors to make a contribution, albeit slight, to ethics in general by critically analyzing his ethics. Because the meaning and problems of Gehlen's ethics cannot be fully understood without knowledge of the main point of his philosophical anthropology̶that is, his fundamental view of the human being̶this paper first discusses this view and then proceeds to explore his ethics. In the first part, I explain Gehlen's belief that, unlike all other species, the human being is independent from(almost)all biological instincts and is consequently the totally cultural(non-biological)being. In this part, I also explain that this belief cannot be supported from the perspective of modern biology(evolutionary theory). In the second part, I illuminate that, in contradiction to his fundamental view of man, Gehlen's pluralistic ethics takes biological components into consideration. I demonstrate at the same time that, besides this theoretically problematic contradiction, there are many other problems in his ethics: unclear and inconsistent explanations of four fundamental moral principles, contradictory arguments about the sharp antagonism between the moral principle of institution(state)and the morality of the Enlightenment(which promotes some other moral principles), etc. Finally, I argue that, in spite of all these problems, Gehlen's ethics has at least one advantage over the ethics of philosophers such as Habermas and Honneth, who criticize his ethics on many points: in contrast to the latter ethics, Gehlen's ethics admits and is open to a certain meaning of biological(evolutionary)elements in our social and moral life̶a meaning that seems to be undeniable in light of modern biology(modern evolutionary theory).