著者

長田 蔵人

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.60-68, 2009-10-01 (Released:2018-02-01)

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We usually recognize instinctively that it is unreasonable to be blamed for something beyond our control or expectations, and that we should be morally evaluated in terms of motives or intensions, which are insusceptible to luck. On the other hand, however, we admit in many cases that luck exerts some influence on agents' moral evaluations. This inconsistency has long been discussed as the problem of 'moral luck'. This paper shows that the same inconsistency can be found in our attitude toward medical malpractice, and considers how to deal with it. According to D. Dickenson, who introduced the concept of moral luck into discussions of medical ethics, bad luck in medical accidents means doctors' misfortune of being blamed for inevitable accidents that occur beyond their control. Medical malpractice, which is caused by negligence and therefore can be prevented, is thus excluded from her consideration. Contrary to this, this paper argues that even regarding cases of negligence, if there are structural, technical factors that can induce such negligence, anybody could make medical errors, and it is in this sense that there exists moral luck in the cases of malpractice. This consideration leads us to the following conclusions; (1) even in the cases of negligence, it may be unreasonable to inflict criminal punishment on doctors, for we cannot clearly distinguish according to criminal law between cases of vicious negligence and those of mere moral luck; (2) a criminal suit is not a proper means to investigate what really occurs in medical malpractice.

著者

長田 蔵人

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.13-26, 2002-09-01

著者

長田 蔵人

出版者

京都大学哲学論叢刊行会

雑誌

哲学論叢 (ISSN:0914143X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.29, pp.13-26, 2002-09-01

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As concerns proofs of "Transcendental Antinomies" in the Critique of Pure Reason, it has been quite a natural attitude to entertain doubts against their validity. This paper picks up some proofs from both Theses and Antitheses of the Antinomies and tries to clarify them in terms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as Reason's "logical postulate." For this purpose, this paper shows, in the first place, a relation between the major premise of "Dialectic Reasoning" and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. What is emphasized in this argument is, it is not this Principle that Kant rejects as a "transcendental Illusion." The root of the Illusion is not that Principle as a "logical postulate, " but the failure in recognizing essentiality of Sensibility for human knowledge. Secondly, upon these arguments, this paper construes each argument of the First, and the Third Antinomies. To understand the ground of inevitability in falling into these Antinomies and of the alleged validity of each proof, it will be necessary to remember that what Kant wanted to deny is not the "postulate" of Reason itself. Reconstructing several proofs of Antinomies from this point of view, this paper makes clear that the Reason's postulate is related to the demand for the unity of nature (Natureinheit), and this demand plays an important role as a keystone in making proofs of the Antinomies 'valid.' As a result of this, finally, we will see that when laying the foundation for the causal law of nature, Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic are imposed a double task of meeting that demand for "Natureinheit" on the one hand, and of 'schematizing' the Principle of Sufficient Reason on the other hand.

著者

長田 蔵人

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, pp.60-68, 2009

---

We usually recognize instinctively that it is unreasonable to be blamed for something beyond our control or expectations, and that we should be morally evaluated in terms of motives or intensions, which are insusceptible to luck. On the other hand, however, we admit in many cases that luck exerts some influence on agents' moral evaluations. This inconsistency has long been discussed as the problem of 'moral luck'. This paper shows that the same inconsistency can be found in our attitude toward medical malpractice, and considers how to deal with it. According to D. Dickenson, who introduced the concept of moral luck into discussions of medical ethics, bad luck in medical accidents means doctors' misfortune of being blamed for inevitable accidents that occur beyond their control. Medical malpractice, which is caused by negligence and therefore can be prevented, is thus excluded from her consideration. Contrary to this, this paper argues that even regarding cases of negligence, if there are structural, technical factors that can induce such negligence, anybody could make medical errors, and it is in this sense that there exists moral luck in the cases of malpractice. This consideration leads us to the following conclusions; (1) even in the cases of negligence, it may be unreasonable to inflict criminal punishment on doctors, for we cannot clearly distinguish according to criminal law between cases of vicious negligence and those of mere moral luck; (2) a criminal suit is not a proper means to investigate what really occurs in medical malpractice.

著者

長田 蔵人

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, pp.141-155, 2008