著者
青木 雅浩
出版者
内陸アジア史学会
雑誌
内陸アジア史研究 (ISSN:09118993)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.127-148, 2013-03-31 (Released:2017-10-10)

The 4th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was held in September and October 1925 after the end of the conflict between E. Rinchino and T. Ryskulov. The present paper analyzes the activities of M. I. Amagaev - the representative of the Comintern in Mongolia - in the 4th Congress and examines the Mongolian policy of the USSR and the Comintern of that time. The Mongolian policy of the USSR and the Comintern since 1923 was to establish the structures of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, to construct the system in which the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party would lead the Mongolian state, and to exclude Noyan and Lama from the party and the government. The USSR and the Comintern planned to continue this course after the end of the conflict between Rinchino and Ryskulov. At the 4th Congress, Amagaev attempted to expand the activities of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in the provinces of Outer Mongolia, to promote the construction of the party, and to execute the Mongolian policy of the USSR and the Comintern. At the 4th Congress, the USSR and the Comintern intended to further their Mongolian policy, which was the main cause of the conflict between Rinchino and Ryskulov. However, it led to the subsequent conflict between Amagaev and Dambadorj.
著者
青木 雅浩
出版者
内陸アジア史学会
雑誌
内陸アジア史研究 (ISSN:09118993)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.25, pp.97-119, 2010-03-31 (Released:2017-10-10)

The political turmoil in Outer Mongolia in the summer of 1924-the purge of S. DANZAN-is undoubtedly one of the most important events in the modern history of Mongolia. This paper analyzes the critical outcome to illuminate its repercussions on the political landscape of Outer Mongolia during this period. The political struggle between A. G. STARKOV and E. RINCHINO started in 1923, after the closing of the Second Congress of the Mongolian People's Party (MPP). With the support of the Comintern's line, A. G. STARKOV promoted a policy that aimed to expel the Mongolian aristocracy (noyans) and lamas from both the Mongolian People's Government (MPG) and the MPP. However, RINCHINO proposed to extend limited cooperation to noyans and lamas as the best possible choice for Outer Mongolia in those days. This led to the year-long confrontation between A. G. STARKOV and S. DANZAN, on the one side, and RINCHINO. In the summer of 1924, RINCHINO ousted A. G. STARKOV and S. DANZAN from the political arena when the Congress of the MPP and the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League were in session. The direct cause of the turmoil in the summer of 1924 lies in the political antagonism between two influential politicians, RINCHINO and A. G. STARKOV. Close examination unveils the fact that the USSR and the Comintern tried to push forward with a policy to drive noyans and lamas out of the MPP and the MPG, a policy eventually rejected by both.
著者
青木 雅浩
出版者
公益財団法人 史学会
雑誌
史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.119, no.3, pp.293-324, 2010-03-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

After resigning as prime minister and foreign minister of the Mongolian People's Government in January 1922, Bodoo, an important leader of the Mongolian People's Party, was purged in the following summer, giving rise to what is called the "Bodoo Affair." After the Mongolian People's Government was formed, Soviet Russia and the Comintern become very important factors determining the political situation in Outer Mongolia; however, the research to date has yet to study the influence exerted by the Bodoo Affair on their strategy. The purpose of this article is to analyze that influence in order to further illuminate the facts surrounding the Affair, the political situation in Outer Mongolia and one aspect of the process in which Soviet Russia expanded its sphere of influence in East Asia. In the beginning, Soviet Russia and the Comintern placed Bodoo in high regard as a politician well suited to their purposes. However, Bodoo himself regarded these two powers as interfering in Outer Mongolia and became opposed to A. Ya. Okhtin, the vice-representative of Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Outer Mongolia. This is why Bodoo left the Mongolian People's Government and along with his comrades tried to pursue ways of developing Outer Mongolia without Soviet assistance. At that time in Outer Mongolia, there were many people who stood against Soviet Russia and the Mongolian People's Government, and Okhtin was well aware of these "anti-Soviet elements." In response, he planned to bring in more Soviet staff members to build the Mongolian People's Party with Soviet Russia's direct participation and form new Party lines suited to the present condition. In practice, however, the new Government included such "anti-Soviet elements" as the Mongolian aristocracy and Buddhist sects in order to stabilize the situation. The article concludes that Soviet Russia and the Comintern were to forced change their former strategy of regarding Outer Mongolia as an "ally" in the face of the Bodoo Affair, which presented an obstacle to their plan to utilize Outer Mongolia in the interest of their national security in the Far East. The Affair brought about changes not only in the formation of the Mongolian People's Government, but also in Soviet Russia's Mongolian policy, thus representing an important turning point in Mongolia's modern history.