著者

高松 基之

出版者

東洋英和女学院大学現代史研究所

雑誌

現代史研究

巻号頁・発行日

no.13, pp.21-78, 2017-03-31

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Since 1945, 13 presidents have been sworn into office as president of the United States. Each president has adopted and developed his own unique management and decision making style. This paper aims to explore how President Dwight D. Eisenhower established his style during his presidency.In the 1950s and 1960s the prevailing image was that Eisenhower was a passive president, who reigned but did not rule, surrounded by an overly protective staff and dominated by strong cabinet secretaries such as John Foster Dulles that have been delegated too much authority. The availability of declassified materials in the Eisenhower Presidential Library challenged his passive image. At present Eisenhower is regarded as a more modern president than his youngersuccessor John F. Kennedy.Eisenhower was a president who deliberately chose to manipulate, organize, and dominate his administration with a hidden hand. Over 35 years of military experience had led Eisenhower to be deeply concerned with organizational problems. For Eisenhower, information, procedures, organization, formal meetings, and informal consultations were preparations for important decisions. Because Eisenhower placed great value on the planning process and intensive discussions, he revitalized the National Security Council (NSC) in the decision process with an appointment of Robert Cutler as the special presidential assistant on national security affairs.President Eisenhower trusted Dulles as Secretary of State and used to consult with him before and after important decisions both on foreign affairs and during the crises. There seemed to an apparent contradiction between the simultaneous existence of a strong secretary of state and a strong NSC in the White House. However, the lack of conflict between Dulles and Cutler was to due to Eisenhower’s solid confidence in secretary of state and the perception of the function of special assistant developed by Cutler. He firmly believed in the role of coordinator. Policy guidelines were formulated from the NSC process and the action of council meetings, operational decisions were usually made in the Oval Office, and diplomacy was largely in the hands of Dulles.

著者

高松 基之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.70, pp.120-138,L8, 1982-05-22 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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The purpose of this paper is to describe how President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reacted to the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Suez Crisis of 1956 with the extensive use of the newly opened materials, such as Eisenhower Diary and Dulles Telephone Calls Transcripts in the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. In particular, this paper attempts to elucidate the following points: First, the U. S. withdrawal from the Aswan project was not Dulles' “spur of the moment” decision, but the result of American efforts to isolate Egypt from other Arab countries. Second, Eisenhower and Dulles had unsuccessfully sought far quick solution of the Suez crisis without any clear courses of action. Third, the U. S. attitude in the Suez crisis had been influenced by the policy makers' optimism that Britain and France might not resort to military force.