著者

黒田 賢治

出版者

法政大学

雑誌

日本文学誌要 (ISSN:02877872)

巻号頁・発行日

no.24, pp.p49-63, 1981-02

著者

黒田 賢治

出版者

日本中東学会

雑誌

日本中東学会年報 (ISSN:09137858)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.1, pp.75-97, 2010-07-15 (Released:2018-03-30)

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This paper aims to consider the state control of the Iranian Shi’ite Islamic jurisprudence academia under Kamenei’s leadership based on a survey of literature and fieldwork from September 1, 2008 to October 29, 2008. Specifically, I will focus on the process of administrative reform in the madrasa complex of Qom (Ḥowze-ye ‘Elmīye-ye Qom) under his leadership and the recent condition of monthly stipend for students in the madrasa complex of Qom. On June 4, 1989, the Assembly of Experts held a meeting and decided to elect Khamenei, who had been president, as the new supreme leader. But Khamenei was a middle-ranking Islamic jurist, Ḥujja al-Islam wa-l-Muslimīn, unlike former supreme leader Khomeynī. This was not accordance that Article of the constitution of 1979, that the supreme leader must be a marja‘-e taqlīd (source of emulation; the title of a highly educated jurisconsult who has his followers) recognized by a large majority of the citizens. This contradiction of Khamenei’s appointment with the constitution was solved by revising the constitution that Khomeini had ordered before his death. In addition, the state encouraged Khomeini’s followers to obey two marāja‘-e taqlīd (pl. of marja‘-e taqlīd) who were recommended by the state. This meant the ruling structure was divided into two spheres: a political sphere and a religious sphere. At the same time, direct control by the state was limited to the former sphere. Thus it was a solution for only one side of the dualistic ruling structure that the state promoted Khamenei for a marja‘-e taqlīd. In 1994, Khamenei was nominated one of the recommended marāja‘-e taqlīd by two ruling support groups. Some researchers pointed out that repressive measures such as house arrest were taken against some high ranking Islamic jurists and their relatives. In other words, the violation by the state was a way of control over the jurisprudence academia. On the other hand, some researchers referred to Khamenei’s leadership in the administrative reform in the madrasa complex of Qom. In addition, they also referred to Khamenei’s financial support there. If their indication was correct, the solution was not only based on the violation. However they did not give enough explanation about not only the administrative reform but also the monthly stipend. Therefore, I attempted to refine their discussion and analyze the way of the state controlling the jurisprudence academia. As a result, I found out the control of the ruling body through an institution based on the above two topics. First, the administrative reform in early 1990s provided institutional connection between the state and new administrative body of the mardasa complex of Qom. Second, there were two types of the monthly stipend system. One was “informal,” the other was “formal.” In the “informal” system, insolvent marāja‘-e taqlīd paid students personally. On the other hand, in the “formal” system, the center for monthly stipend under the new administrative body collected money from each solvent marāja‘-e taqlīd and distributed this to students. At the same time, Khamenei absorbed more than thirty percent of total amount in the “formal” system. Then, these results meant a way of the state controlling the jurisprudence academia based on institution.