著者

橋本 哲 HASHIMOTO Satoshi

出版者

名古屋大学文学部

雑誌

名古屋大学文学部研究論集. 哲学 (ISSN:04694716)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, pp.1-33, 2016-03-31

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Certainty is one of the themes which Wittgenstein was interested in. His thoughts are left in the form of notes named On Certainty. He has put down in it a series of remarks on the usage of such words as ʻknowledgeʼ, ʻdoubtʼ, ʻbeliefʼ, ʻcertaintyʼ, etc. and the foundation of language-games related to them. I try in this paper to illuminate how the ordinary language-games about knowledge, doubt, belief, etc. relate with ʻunshakeable things (Moore-type propositions (Marie McGinn), hinges (Danièle Moyal-Sharrock))ʼ. Certainty belongs to ʻunshakeable thingsʼ that underlie all our ordinary language-games. Knowledge and certainty belong to different layers of our epistemic capacities (different categories). McGinn showed that Moore-type propositions can not be used in epistemic context. Moyal-Sharrock showed that hinges are rules of grammar and that they can manifest themselves only in what we say and do. But they could not definitely distinguish the certainty of the ʻunshakeable thingsʼ from their causes.

著者

橋本 哲 Hashimoto Satoshi

出版者

名古屋大学文学部

雑誌

名古屋大学文学部研究論集 (ISSN:04694716)

巻号頁・発行日

no.61, pp.75-96, 2015

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Strawson argues that there is another way with scepticism which is not an attempt directly to refute it by rational argument drawing on commonsense or theological or quasi-scientific considerations. Vis-à-vis traditional scepticism he proposes the naturalist position. He considers a response which dose not so much attempt to meet the challenge as to pass it by. In characterizing the position he yokes Wittgenstein to Hume. In his naturalism Strawson dose not examine the reason for the certainty with 'unshakeable thing', but argues only the causes of them. According to Wittgenstein, certainty belongs to 'unshakeable thing' that underlies all our ordinary language-games. In the entire system of our language-games 'unshakeable thing' belongs to the foundation of it and the whole language-games rests on this kind of certainty. Ordinary language-games such as about knowledge, doubt, belief, etc. make sense only when our language-game has 'unshakeable thing' as foundation. The status of 'unshakeable things' can be conceived as propositions of grammar; in the system of our empirical propositions they have a peculiar logical role, that is, they have the character of a rule. Strawson fails to grasp the point of view about the system of our language-games.