著者

上田 薫 Kaoru UEDA

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.105-110, 2006

著者

上田 薫 Kaoru UEDA

出版者

杉野服飾大学

雑誌

杉野服飾大学・杉野服飾大学短期大学部紀要 (ISSN:13483501)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.105-110, 2006

著者

KAZUHARU KIYONO MASAHIRO OKUNO-FUJIWARA KAORU UEDA

出版者

JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

雑誌

The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.4, pp.347-361, 1991-12-20 (Released:2007-10-19)

参考文献数

17

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This paper inquires into the effect of choice of protection means, tariffs or quotas, on the economy's protection level for a small country within a specific-factor model when the protection level is determined by the lobbying activities by each industry (non-cooperative game) or jointly by negotiations of all the industries concerned (cooperative game). We will see that strategic interaction among lobbying industries gives rise to non-equivalence between tariffs and quotas.