著者

佐藤 祐一

出版者

東京大学大学院教育学研究科

雑誌

東京大学大学院教育学研究科紀要 (ISSN:13421050)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, pp.351-362, 2012-03-10

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The whole discussion presents a critique of Wittgenstein's rule-following problem based on Dummett's theory of meaning in educational relevance. Despite the admission that meaning is use and the emphasis of ostensive training in language acquisition, Wittgenstein and Dummett elaborated decisively irreconcilable arguments over explicability of meaning. Repudiation of Frege's realism and obliteration of systematic accounts of verbal practices in Wittgenstein identify themselves with the exegesis that a blind correspondence of an act is the only criterion for rule-following. Contrastingly Dummett, contending that this assumption embodies constant danger of incommunicability, formalises, on grounds of Frege's distinction among sense, reference, and force, a theory of meaning which reasonably clarifies our knowledge in understanding a sentence. It is conjectured that Dummett's proclamation that a theory of sense, the mode of representation of understanding, can not only be shown but also be stated infers that a harmonious transformation between these two states arises in the process of conservative expansion; namely a sense firstly presented in an ostensive manner becomes constitutive of effectively decidable statements instrumental both in systematic refinement of our learning and in a grasp of another newly shown. Nonetheless, the question of how this transformation practically manifests itself, largely depending on subject matters, still remains unsolved, which has to be meticulously scrutinised in diverse curriculum studies. A concluding remark also notifies that "philosophy of thought" proposed by Dummett, which should elucidate in what a grasp of meaning expressed by language consists, must be established as a philosophical basis of education.