著者
伊勢田 哲治
出版者
名古屋大学人間情報学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.59-82, 2011-04-30

In this paper, I propose to integrate two developing subjects of humanities education, namely Critical Thinking (CT) and Science, Technology and Society (STS). The two educational subjects have some motivations in common (such as fostering critical attitude and understanding science and technology), but there are aspects in which they do not fit together well. For example, the deficit model of communication is accused in STS, but the main mode of education in CT is actually based on the model. To solve the problem, I introduce a series of conceptual devices (such as 'bilateral CT model' and 'meta CT') that help the integration of two subjects. I also briefly propose a concrete model of education, namely debate-induced CT education, which naturally integrates CT and STS.
著者
伊勢田 哲治
出版者
名古屋大学人間情報学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya Journal of Philosophy (ISSN:18821634)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.4-24, 2013

This paper surveys the discussions on a Whig historiography in history of science, and proposed a more contextualized treatment of the issue. Since the mid-60s. a Whig historiography. i.e. reconstructing the history as a progress toward the present, has been accused as a wrong way of writing history. However, subsequent discussions of the issue, especially by David Hull and Stephen Brush, tend to allow a certain amount of presentism, i.e. writing history from the point of view of the present. What is needed is a clarification of various different types of prcsentism, and I propose four of them (perspective, negative, positive and evaluative). Some authors also suggest that Whig historiography is OK for historical writings by scientists themselves. Even though such context sensitivity is reasonable, the transcontextuality of written works makes it hard to pigeonhole various contexts if the case of history-of-science writings.
著者
伊勢田 哲治
出版者
名古屋大学人間情報学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya journal of philosophy (ISSN:18821634)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.10, pp.4-24, 2013

This paper surveys the discussions on a Whig historiography in history of science, and proposed a more contextualized treatment of the issue. Since the mid-60s. a Whig historiography. i.e. reconstructing the history as a progress toward the present, has been accused as a wrong way of writing history. However, subsequent discussions of the issue, especially by David Hull and Stephen Brush, tend to allow a certain amount of presentism, i.e. writing history from the point of view of the present. What is needed is a clarification of various different types of prcsentism, and I propose four of them (perspective, negative, positive and evaluative). Some authors also suggest that Whig historiography is OK for historical writings by scientists themselves. Even though such context sensitivity is reasonable, the transcontextuality of written works makes it hard to pigeonhole various contexts if the case of history-of-science writings.
著者
伊勢田 哲治 Iseda Tetsuji
出版者
名古屋大学人間情報学研究科情報創造論講座
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.29-53, 2006 (Released:2006-08-10)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implication of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) for foundationalism. On a first look Rawls and Daniels seem to propose versions of reflective equilibrium as a method of coherentism. However, the method of WRE is also compatible with modest foundationalism, and some passages of Rawls and Daniels suggest that they too allow this possibility. The version of foundationalism I endorse is a pluralist one in which not only considered judgments but also ethical principles and background theories can be included in the set of basic judgments.
著者
伊勢田 哲治 Iseda Tetsuji
出版者
名古屋大学人間情報学研究科情報創造論講座
雑誌
Nagoya Journal of Philosophy (ISSN:18821634)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.29-53, 2006

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implication of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) for foundationalism. On a first look Rawls and Daniels seem to propose versions of reflective equilibrium as a method of coherentism. However, the method of WRE is also compatible with modest foundationalism, and some passages of Rawls and Daniels suggest that they too allow this possibility. The version of foundationalism I endorse is a pluralist one in which not only considered judgments but also ethical principles and background theories can be included in the set of basic judgments.