- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- vol.37, no.1, pp.61-75, 2004-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
One of alleged problems of Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus (TLP) is that we could give no example of its basic concepts such as elementary propositions, names, states of affairs, simple objects, and so on. The problem is so serious, because it means that the whole theoretical system of TLP could have no applicability. Noya, in his recent book on TLP, proposes to regard ordinary objects familiar to us in our daily life, such as persons, dogs, mountains, rock bands, and so on, as examples of simple objects of TLP. But, I think, we cannot interpret TLP in the way his proposal suggests. In this paper I shall show there is no sense in which we can say ordinary objects are simple objects of TLP. There are two main reasons. One concerns TLP's requirement of logical independency of elementary propositions, and the other concerns TLP's requirement that simple objects should exist independently of what is the case.