著者
大木 毅
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1989, no.91, pp.101-119,L11, 1989-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
83

In 1941, England was determined to continue the war against Germany, and the collapse of German blitzkrieg-strategy against Soviet Russia was evident to any one. Despite the situation, Germany declared war on the third great power, the United States. Why? The purpose of this paper is to answer the question and to analyze its political process.Adolf Hitler who had failed to defeat England in 1940, decided to overthrow Soviet Russia with the intentions of taking over the hegemony of the Continent and of compelling England into peace negotiations. But in the meantime the United States was applying strong measures against Germany. Germany would have to fight the United States sooner or later, but American rearmament was not yet complete. So judged Hitler the state of affairs from the reports of military attache in Washington, D. C. and other Capitals. And he expected Japan to enter the war on England, or England and the United States with the hope of diverting Anglo-American military efforts into the Pacific.But Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, had another conception: the conception of a continental bloc of four powers, Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet-Russia. He had the same perception of America as Hitler, its incomplete militarization, and he intended to bring England to its knees, to detain the United States in neutrality and to turn over the warlike policy against Soviet Russia indirectly, by enticing Japan into the war against England. Yet the “traditional group” in foreign ministry (Ernst Frh. v. Weizsäcker and others) was anxious about war in Russia, and dissented from the underestimation of America and anti-American measures. It was important above all for them that Germany put all her energies into the Anglo-German war, so they attempted to urge Japan into the war with England.German navy insisted that they had to carry out the war on merchant shipping to defeat England, even if it caused war with America. But Hitler who was afraid of accidental war against England and America while fighting in Russia, prohibited the navy from the use of arms against American ships. The Navy also expected Japan to take action against England for the sake of tying down Anglo-American forces in Far East. From so various reasons, “actors” in the German decision-making process consented in appearance to drive Japan into the war against England before the beginning of Japan-United States negotiations and the German invasion into Russia.However the outbreak of Russo-German war in June, 1941 deprived Ribbentrop and diplomatic “traditional group” of the precondition of their one-front war policy-only against England. So they made overthrowing of Soviet-Russia their primary object, and switched from “against England” to “against Soviet Russia” in cooperation with Japan. But Hitler was so optimistic in the conflict with Soviet Russia that he expected victory before Japan entered the war against England. Here was displayed the duality of German policy towards Japan, the Hitler-Navy vs. Ribbentrop-“traditional group” in foreign ministry. And the escalation of American hostile actions in the Atlantic made the German Navy demand the removal of the restrictions upon attack on American ships more acutely. Hitler also came to consider the war against America more seriously. Yet Ribbentrop's policy was to keep the United States out of the war, and the diplomatic “traditional group” approved of this. Thus in the policy towards America, confrontation between the Hitler-Navy and Foreign ministry appeared.But this opposition in the political process did not become serious during the German advance into Russia. However the obscure attitude of Japan concerning Japan-United States negotiations and American hostile actions stalemated German foreign policy. And once the lack of ability to conquer Soviet Russia within 1941 became clear from

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そしていずれ米国と大きな衝突に至ることが確定しているなら、来るべき対米戦争を日本と共同で戦おうというのがヒトラーとリッベントロップの意志だったのです。つまり対米開戦は日独の意図した形で決定されたといって良いでしょう。 詳しくはこの論文に記述されています→ https://t.co/H1pATTtrmu
前段は、英語圏の修正主義派の著書を参照して書かれたものですが、テーマど真ん中のこの論文を多少検索して読んでいれば避けられる内容だし(https://t.co/zal75PDfgP)、後段は故・岡崎久彦の前でそれを言ってみろという話になりますね。
大木先生の「ドイツの対米開戦ーその研究史」(https://t.co/QrJOJFRfaX)「ドイツの対米開戦(一九四一年)ーその政治過程を中心に」(https://t.co/OB9pSXddqU)は両方とも今はPDFで読める(ありがたい)。

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