著者

大木 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.91, pp.101-119,L11, 1989-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

83

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In 1941, England was determined to continue the war against Germany, and the collapse of German blitzkrieg-strategy against Soviet Russia was evident to any one. Despite the situation, Germany declared war on the third great power, the United States. Why? The purpose of this paper is to answer the question and to analyze its political process.Adolf Hitler who had failed to defeat England in 1940, decided to overthrow Soviet Russia with the intentions of taking over the hegemony of the Continent and of compelling England into peace negotiations. But in the meantime the United States was applying strong measures against Germany. Germany would have to fight the United States sooner or later, but American rearmament was not yet complete. So judged Hitler the state of affairs from the reports of military attache in Washington, D. C. and other Capitals. And he expected Japan to enter the war on England, or England and the United States with the hope of diverting Anglo-American military efforts into the Pacific.But Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, had another conception: the conception of a continental bloc of four powers, Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet-Russia. He had the same perception of America as Hitler, its incomplete militarization, and he intended to bring England to its knees, to detain the United States in neutrality and to turn over the warlike policy against Soviet Russia indirectly, by enticing Japan into the war against England. Yet the “traditional group” in foreign ministry (Ernst Frh. v. Weizsäcker and others) was anxious about war in Russia, and dissented from the underestimation of America and anti-American measures. It was important above all for them that Germany put all her energies into the Anglo-German war, so they attempted to urge Japan into the war with England.German navy insisted that they had to carry out the war on merchant shipping to defeat England, even if it caused war with America. But Hitler who was afraid of accidental war against England and America while fighting in Russia, prohibited the navy from the use of arms against American ships. The Navy also expected Japan to take action against England for the sake of tying down Anglo-American forces in Far East. From so various reasons, “actors” in the German decision-making process consented in appearance to drive Japan into the war against England before the beginning of Japan-United States negotiations and the German invasion into Russia.However the outbreak of Russo-German war in June, 1941 deprived Ribbentrop and diplomatic “traditional group” of the precondition of their one-front war policy-only against England. So they made overthrowing of Soviet-Russia their primary object, and switched from “against England” to “against Soviet Russia” in cooperation with Japan. But Hitler was so optimistic in the conflict with Soviet Russia that he expected victory before Japan entered the war against England. Here was displayed the duality of German policy towards Japan, the Hitler-Navy vs. Ribbentrop-“traditional group” in foreign ministry. And the escalation of American hostile actions in the Atlantic made the German Navy demand the removal of the restrictions upon attack on American ships more acutely. Hitler also came to consider the war against America more seriously. Yet Ribbentrop's policy was to keep the United States out of the war, and the diplomatic “traditional group” approved of this. Thus in the policy towards America, confrontation between the Hitler-Navy and Foreign ministry appeared.But this opposition in the political process did not become serious during the German advance into Russia. However the obscure attitude of Japan concerning Japan-United States negotiations and American hostile actions stalemated German foreign policy. And once the lack of ability to conquer Soviet Russia within 1941 became clear from

著者

大木 毅 オオキ タケシ Takeshi Ohki

雑誌

史苑

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.56-72, 1989-04

著者

大木毅 [著]

出版者

KADOKAWA

巻号頁・発行日

2019

著者

大木毅上田暁共著

出版者

原書房

巻号頁・発行日

1983

著者

大木 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.109, pp.22-37,L6, 1995

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Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Hack is famous for his attempt at peacemaking between Japan and the United States in Switzerland at the end of the Second World War. But he cut a figure not only as a peace-maker, but also as a Key player in Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's. The aim of this article is to reconstruct the life of Friedrich Hack as for as possible and thereby to shed light on the not well known role of the Imperial Japanese Navy in Japan's policy toward Germany between the two World Wars.<br>Dr. Hack, who was taken POW by the Japanese at the siege of Tsingtao in 1914, became a weapons broker after the First World War and became influential in Japanese-German aero-naval relations, because the Japanese Navy was interested in acquiring German advanced technology, for example U-Boat and war planes, while Germany maintained the level of weapon-technology that was prohibited by Versailles Treaties by selling them to Japan.<br>After the Nazi seizure of power Hack's activity expanded into the sphere of foreign policy. His influence upon Japan absorbed the attention of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of the intelligence department of the German armed forces, and Joachim v. Ribbentrop who intended to bring about better relations with Japan. So Hack played the role as the initiator of "Anti Comintern Pact". But his success brought conflicts with the Nazi Party and others in "National Socialistic Polycracy" and resulted in his arrest.<br>Through the help of the Japanese Navy, Hack could live the life of an exile in Switzerland after the outbreak of the Second World War and served as an informant for the Japanese Navy. This activity of Hack led to the peace-mediation between the Japaneses Navy and the U. S. Office of Strategic Services.<br>Friedrich Hack symbolizes a aspect of Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's and the early 1940's.

著者

植田 篤史 松村 葵 相見 貴行 新熊 孝文 大木 毅 中村 康雄

出版者

一般社団法人 日本スポーツ理学療法学会

雑誌

スポーツ理学療法学 (ISSN:27584356)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.1, pp.7-15, 2024 (Released:2023-09-30)

参考文献数

35

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【目的】肩甲骨の運動異常(Scapular Dyskinesis:SDK)を有する野球選手の肩屈曲運動中の肩甲骨運動を評価すること。【方法】対象は肩挙上・下制時ならびに投球時に肩関節痛のない野球選手51名とした。SDKの評価はSDKを4つのtypeに分類し(type I~IV),type Iを認めた場合は異常群,type IVの場合は正常群とした。測定は肩屈曲動作を実施し,三次元動作解析装置を用いて,肩甲骨と肩関節の角度を算出した。解析区間は,肩屈曲30°~120°位の肩甲骨の上下方回旋,内外旋,前後傾角度を算出した。【結果】異常群の挙上期30°~90°の肩甲骨の後傾は正常群に比較して,有意に小さかった(p<0.05)。また,異常群の下制期30°~60°の肩甲骨前傾は正常群に比較して,有意に大きかった(p<0.01)。【結論】SDK type Iを有する無症状の野球選手の肩屈曲動作中の肩甲骨運動の特徴として,挙上期30°~90°の肩甲骨の過小な後傾と下制期30~60°の過剰な前傾運動を呈していることが明らかとなった。