- 著者
-
青木 滋之
- 出版者
- 日本イギリス哲学会
- 雑誌
- イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.26, pp.21-38, 2003-03-20 (Released:2018-04-25)
- 参考文献数
- 18
It has been debated whether Locke holds direct realism or representative theory of perception. This paper examines the key concept, things themselves, to help determine that Locke is really a supporter of representative theory of perception. Yolton's view of things themselves — its emphasis on natural history of the day — is criticized for not adequately dealing with another decisive feature of things themselves — the corpuscular structure of the body. With this latter concept considered, Locke's idea should be seen as immediate object of mind, indicating that things themselves cannot be perceived in a direct way.