著者

三浦 雅弘

出版者

慶應義塾大学

雑誌

哲學 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.86, pp.27-58, 1988

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1. 「抽象」と「一般化」2. ロックにおける「抽象観念」3. バークリの批判4. バークリの提案とその解釈 (1) 言語と観念 : 「記号的表示」の理論 (2) バークリの語用論的アスペクト (3) バークリ批判の検討5. バークリにおける「抽象」 (1) 「抽象」能力の容認 (2) 容認の帰結 (3) 「抽象」の実相6. バークリの「普遍論争」へのコミットメント7. 回顧と展望Generally we regard both Locke and Berkeley as "nominalists". But correctly speaking, they should be called "nominalistic realists", because they restrict what exists to what is particular, and yet admit that predications extending beyond some original paradigm specimens may be valid. But Berkeley blames Locke bitterly for "abstract or general ideas", which are, according to Locke, the bonds between particular things that exist and the names they are to be ranked under. His attack on Locke results from two theoretical bases, one of which is his ontology and the other is his theory of "signification". On the latter we should pay attention to his pragmatic point of view. Though Berkeley rejects "abstract ideas" in the Lockean sense, he doesn't necessarily deny our ability to abstract. I suppose the abstraction level he rejects is not "abstraction" but "generalization" to be exact. And, with Berkeley, the epistemological condition that precedes the ability to abstract within the limits of his permission and "general ideas" in the Berkeleian sense, is our ability to perceive "likeness" between particulars, in my opinion.