著者

石田 京子

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.131, pp.129-152, 2013-03

---

This article examines the reason why the relation between subjectsand objects is understood to have a double meaning in ImmanuelKant's deduction of private rights. To this end, I focus on Kant'sargument of the theory of private rights §1–7 in Metaphysics of Morals. The theme of this particular section is the justification of anouter "mine" and "yours."Drawing from his own transcendental philosophy, Kant indicatesin the theory of private rights that the notion of possession can beunderstood in two ways; physical (sensible) possession and merelyrightful (intelligible) possession. What Kant denotes here is how theideas concerning law are understood independently of empirical elements.Kant thereby criticizes empirical justifications of privaterights in general and attempts to prove that only intelligible possessionmakes possible the distinction between an outer "mine" and"yours."However, it is impossible for a human being as finite and rationalto grasp this intelligible relation between subjects and objects empirically,as Kant indicates repeatedly in his Rechtslehre. The notion ofintelligible possession has practical meaning only when all personssubmit to the universal principle of Right which binds them to re-spect others' possessions ("his" and "hers"). The legal relation betweensubjects and objects is converted into a reciprocal relation betweenpersons who exclude one another's interference with outerobjects when the idea of intelligible possession is applied to an empiricalobject.投稿論文