著者

浅野 光紀

出版者

三田哲學會

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.135, pp.25-43, 2015-03

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投稿論文Panpsychism is the view that all things have mind or a mindlike quality, whether or not they are parts of living organisms. The purpose of this paper is to clarify this basic thesis and examine the historical meaning of the recent resurgence of panpsychism in the contemporary mind-body debate.Modern Physicalism inherited the Cartesian, dualistic conception of matter, which is lifeless and devoid of any experiential character. I will argue that this makes it difficult even for the weakest form of physicalism, namely emergentism or non-reductive materialism, to coherently reconcile its two basic doctorines 'physicalist ontology and reality of mind' and panpsychism more plausible.