著者

⽮⼝ 啓朗

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.88-103, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

78

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Why did Russia abandon the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, which was Russo-Turkish alliance, and accept the Straits Convention, which was signed by 5 powers on 13 July 1841? Previous studies have cited three reasons for this: (1) Russia’s weakened influence over the Ottoman Empire, (2) Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode’s orientation toward the Concert of Europe, and (3) France’s isolation. However, how did Russia evaluate the ability of its alliance partner? Using a commitment problem as an analytical framework, this study will clarify the security problems which Russia perceived in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and how it attempted to rectify them through the Straits Convention.In the first half of the 19th century, Russia, seeking to keep the Ottoman Empire vulnerable, gave military support to the Empire, which was reeling from the First Egyptian-Turkish War. After being approached by the Ottomans for an alliance, Russia signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi with the aim of expanding its influence over the Ottoman Empire and prohibiting the passage of foreign warships through the Dardanelles. However, this treaty not only caused a fierce opposition from Britain, which Russia had not expected, but also threatened the security of the Black Sea coastal region, which she had hoped.What did Russian policymakers think of these security threats? First, the Russian Military Officers questioned the Ottoman Empire’s military capabilities and believed that they would have to occupy the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the event of a war with Britain, regardless of the intentions of their allied partner. Nesselrode also saw the Ottoman Empire as incapable of resisting British and French pressure and recognized that the conflict with Britain posed a serious threat to Russia’s security environment. And when the Second Egyptian-Turkish War broke out, Russia began to fear that it would be drawn into a war with Britain in the Straits region.In this situation, Russia tried to defuse the situation by participating in the conference of the five European powers. Russia approached Great Britain to abrogate the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and conclude a new agreement that would prohibit the passage of warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Russia believed that a new agreement, based on the Concert of Europe, would be more credible in its commitment to prohibit the passage of warships through both straits than the Russo—Turkish bilateral alliance. Although it was also Russia’s goal to isolate France at the London Conference, Russia believed that its commitment to the ban on passage through the Straits could be maintained with the agreement of the four powers, regardless of France’s consent. It can be said that the abrogation of Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was the result of seeking a more reliable guarantee to replace the Ottoman Empire, which was uncertain about its commitment to the Dardanelles blockade, besides easing tensions with Britain.

著者

矢口 啓朗

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_17-206_33, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

113

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The Quadruple Alliance, which was signed by Russia, Great Britain, Austria and Prussia on November 20, 1815, established the foundation of the Congress System. However, the main object of this Alliance was the prevention of another instance of French aggression. In the 1830s, the international order was threatened by the French July Monarchy, which wanted to influence neighboring countries through ideas of liberalism. The autocrat of Russia, Tsar Nicholas I, who was afraid of these ideas, tried to prevent the spread of French influence. Many previous studies have emphasized that he strengthened relationships with the Holly Alliance. However, this study focuses on Russia’s relationship with Great Britain and reveals the Russo-British partnerships in the Quadruple Alliance for the defense of the Vienna System when Britain was governed by the liberal Whig Party during most of the 1830s.Although there was a liberal ideological identity, in both Great Britain and France in the 1830s, the two countries had many conflicts of interest in Europe and the Near East. The Whig government never permitted France to expand its influence over Belgium and Syria. For example, when a son of the King of France was recommended as the new Belgian king in January 1831, the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston rejected this idea, because Britain could not agree to the practical annexation of Belgium by France. In addition, since Britain showed negative attitudes to France in 1831, Russia could be sure of Britain’s commitment to the Continent through the Quadruple Alliance. Although in 1832 the ideological differences between Russia and Britain appeared with the passing of the Reform Act in Britain and by means of Belgian independence, Russia relied on Britain to deflect French aggression to neighboring countries. However, after the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which was signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire on July 8, 1833, Britain approached France because they did not agree with the expansion of Russia’s influence in the Near East.Nevertheless, during the Second Syrian Crisis, when the divergent and conflicting of Anglo-French interests in the Near East resurfaced, Russia approached Britain and took the initiative to develop the First Straits Convention, signed without France on July 15, 1840. Since “disgraced” France was threatening its neighboring countries into signing another convention, Russia demanded Britain’s commitment to defend Europe. Britain agreed to deflect the French invasion, although it did not want to sign a formal agreement. Russia used the Quadruple Alliance as a tool for involving liberal Britain in consistent defense against France in the 1830s. This Alliance contributed to the preservation of the Vienna System even after the collapse of the Congress System through the continued solidarity of the Four Powers against France.