著者
加藤 之敬
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.69, pp.170-184, 2018-04-01 (Released:2018-08-01)

This paper intends to clarify Nietzsche’s concept of “contest.” This is because “contest” is an important concept in properly understanding Nietzsche’s view of our relation to others. In many cases, Nietzsche regards relation to others as a struggle, which may lead readers to think that Nietzsche considers relation to others negatively because struggle is associated with denying, suppressing, and destroying others. However, this interpretation is a misunderstanding. For Nietzsche, struggle is not only negative but also positive - if it is a form of relation in which people recognize others and which is associated with productive activity. This is clear from his early text, “Homer’s Contest.” In this text, he divides struggle into two forms: a positive and productive struggle, namely “contest,” on the one hand, and a negative and destructive struggle, namely “annihilative struggle,” on the other. Moreover, he postulates that “contest” was the foundation of progress in ancient Greek culture. Thus, in “Homer’s Contest,” Nietzsche considers “contest” to be the ideal relation to others. Furthermore, in discussing “contest,” Nietzsche often compares ancient and modern cultures, criticizing modern culture’s inability to create the conditions for forming an ideal relation to others. Nietzsche’s concept of “contest” has three fundamental elements: first, affirmation of envy and ambition, which are regarded as negative in the modern age; second, the necessity of equal or more powerful rivals and the availability of people who are capable of estimating correctly; and third, the necessity of maintaining pluralism. In this paper, these elements are explained in detail in order to clarify Nietzsche’s opinion on the ideal relation to others, namely “contest,” and emphasize his critical attitude toward modern culture apparent in “Homer’s Contest.
著者
加藤 之敬
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, pp.113-126, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

This paper clarifies Nietzsche’s sense of an ideal human by considering his concept of “genius.” Genius is a traditional concept, and Nietzsche uses it uniquely to express his ideal human in his early period. There are two important points. First, he regards classical Greek culture as the ideal environment for producing a group of geniuses, and he contends that the classical Greek philosophers from Tales to Socrates form a group of geniuses. Second, he was influenced by Schopenhauer’s concept of genius and extracts from Schopenhauer’s view on genius in many of his unpublished works. Focusing on these points clarifies the core of Nietzsche’s concept of genius as “freedom.” He perceives a genius as a free person, in which being free means freedom from others that allows a person to be himself or herself. Nietzsche was influenced by Pindar’s maxim and believed throughout his life that it is important to be oneself. Nietzsche understood a genius as a free person in the sense that she or he endeavors to be herself or himself. The idea of “being oneself” does not mean personally discovering what exists, but personally creating new things. In Schopenhauer as educator, Nietzsche indicates that true selfhood is beyond the present sense of self. Individuals who endeavor to be themselves know their orientations through the models they long to emulate and imitate the models to sublimate what the models embody into their unique forms. Through these activities, geniuses create themselves anew and as unique beings. In sum, a genius, who is Nietzsche’s ideal human, should be a free person in the sense that he or she continually endeavors to create himself or herself.