著者
加藤 美保子
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2019, no.48, pp.1-18, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)
参考文献数
40

The Ukraine crisis and subsequent Western sanctions have accelerated Russia’s economic dependence on China. Since the annexation of Crimea, scholars and analysts of Russia’s Asia policy have focused on Russia’s pivot to China and disregarded any preceding diversification policies throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This paper has two purposes. First, the paper aims to explain geopolitical changes in Russia’s Asia pivot policy over the last 20 years by analyzing not only Moscow’s strategic thinking towards major Asian powers―including the US, China, Japan, and South Korea, ―but also the restoration of its relationship with former Soviet partners such as India, Vietnam, and North Korea―. Second, this paper examines the impact of the Russia-US confrontation and the emerging friendship regime between Russia and its traditional partners in light of a Eurasian security order.The first section explains Russia’s strategic thought and policies towards the Asia-Pacific region from 2000 to 2012 by focusing on two factors: 1) The Asia-Pacific region as an emerging political and economic centre in a multipolar world vis-à-vis a US-led unipolar world. 2) The Asia-Pacific region where Russia needs to overcome isolation by restoring traditional diplomatic relations with China, India, Vietnam, and North Korea. The second section explains Russia’s aspiration as a Euro-Pacific power under the third Putin administration before the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. In this period, Russia’s diversification policy in the Eastern direction expanded to the Pacific region including US allies. The third section describes how Russia accelerated its economic dependence on China under the deterioration of relations with the US by analysing energy and military cooperation with China. The fourth section evaluates the impact of the Russia-US confrontation at the global and regional levels as well as the Russia-China quasi-alliance in a newly emerging order in Eurasia.In conclusion, this paper reveals three findings. First, Russia’s geopolitical direction in its “Pivot to the East” policy developed in three steps: 1) the restoration of relations with former soviet partners to overcome isolation in the region (2000–2012); 2) regaining self-confidence as a great power and seeking aspiration as a Euro-Pacific power (2012–2014); 3) deterioration of relations with the US and subsequent economic dependence on China. This paper reveals that Russia has barely retained its multi vector foreign policy by developing and utilizing relations with former Soviet partners such as India and Vietnam even after March 2014, whereas Russia has accelerated its China-centred foreign and economic policy since the annexation of Crimea, as indicated in other research. Second, while Russia’s “pivot to China” policy is inherently based on economic incentives, Russian leadership views relations with China largely through the lens of US-Russia relations. Currently, as Moscow does not anticipate an opportunity to improve its relations with the US, Russia is unlikely to review its China-centred policy in the short and medium term. Third, the Russia-China strategic partnership is becoming a quasi-alliance in terms of military cooperation. For Russia, the only constructive means to remain a great power in Eurasia is to actively engage in both military cooperation and China-led regional order such as the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”, to prevent further isolation in Eurasia. Meanwhile, its strengthened strategic partnerships with traditional Asian partners―the sole achievement of its early “Asia pivot” policy―will serve well to balance relations with China.
著者
加藤 美保子
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.41, pp.28-44, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)
参考文献数
71

This article explains the opportunities and problems of Russia’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (APR) under Putin’s third presidency. On 7 May 2012, president Putin signed Executive Orders for “implementing plans for developing Armed Forces and modernizing military-industrial complex” and “measures to implement foreign policy.” The first section of this article analyzes these documents from the viewpoint of Russia’s policy towards the Asia-Pacific region and points out the need for paying attention to the changes in the security environment both in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia during the past 12 years, which have been ignored in previous research on the background of Russia’s assertive Asia policy. The above two documents show the significant changes in the Russia’s Asia-Pacific as follows. Firstly, the former document announces Moscow’s intention to develop the Navy, first and foremost in the Arctic areas and in Russia’s Far East with the aim of protecting the Russian Federation’s strategic interests. Secondly, the latter documents showed the national interests in deepening an equal, trust-based partnership and strategic cooperation with China, strategic partnerships with India and Vietnam, and developing mutual beneficial relations with America’s traditional allies, that is Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Given those changes, the second section of this article strives to demonstrate the qualitative changes in the relations among three major powers (the U.S., China and Russia) in the Asia-Pacific region by focusing on the trade balance, demand-supply situation of energy resources, and security issues. Finally, the third section discusses how Russia’s foreign policy towards APR will be affected by China’s advancement to the Arctic sea and the South China Sea and also the U.S. military shift to APR. In conclusion, this paper makes three points. First, unlike the old triangular relations in the Cold War era that were characterized by predominance of military capacity, both the areas of common interests and conflicts were diversified from trade, energy resources to traditional and non-traditional security issues in today’s U.S.-China-Russia relations. Second, China’s advancement to the Arctic sea through Sea of Japan has the potential to provoke the military competition between Russia and China, however this situation may offer an opportunity to deepen the cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in maritime security. Third, this article points out that the heightening tension between the U.S. and China as well as China and Vietnam in the South China Sea provides Russia with an opportunity to engage in regional affairs, for example, participation in the East Asia Summit. However, strategic partnership both with China and Vietnam complicates Russia’s attitudes towards Vietnam.
著者
加藤 美保子
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2005, no.34, pp.88-100, 2005 (Released:2010-05-31)

The purpose of this article is to examine Russia's motives and the process of its entry into the Asia-Pacific regional cooperation in the political and security area. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been evolving its multilateral diplomacy in this region. Today Russia participates in not only the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Six-Party Talks, but also the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) . In post-cold war Asia Pacific, ASEAN's Forums which respect the consensus and the voluntarism and lead the regional cooperation mechanism coexist with the traditional bilateral alliances between the United States and the countries of the region. Some of the most compelling studies have explained Russia's heightened interest in the Asia Pacific in the latter half of the 1990s from the viewpoint of NATO enlargement. This interest, however, should also be examined in the context of the political and economic relations between Russia and the Asia Pacific countries. This paper focuses on Russia's political relations with ASEAN.First, the direction toward stressing multilateral institutions has roots in Gorbachev's diplomatic concept. Pre-Gorbachev Soviet security initiatives in Asia developed from the strategy of confrontation with western military blocks or containment of China. On the other hand, Gorbachev drew the lessons from ending their confrontation with capitalism. By doing so he succeeded in improving Soviet bilateral relations with a variety of countries in the Asia-Pacific, maintaining the stability of the international environment. In particular, Gorbachev aimed to expand the bilateral economic relations between the Soviet Union and the non-socialist countries such as Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN as well as participate in PECC, PBEC, and APEC to promote its Siberia and Far Eastern socioeconomic development.Second, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was first involved in the political and security cooperation led by ASEAN before entering the economic cooperation framework. This meant Russia was needed as a guarantor of peace and stability in Southeast Asia rather than just as an economic partner in Asia Pacific countries.Third, since the late 1990s Russia and ASEAN have gradually institutionalized their relationship. In 1996, when Russian Foreign Minister E. Primakov made a speech at the annual ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences, he described ASEAN as the most important center of a multipolar world. In the first half of the 1990s Russia had little interest in the ASEAN regional forum because Russia devoted herself to democratization and the transition to a market economy. The priority in the foreign policy was given to the relationship with Europe, the United States, and the former republics of the Soviet Union. However, the NATO enlargement in 1997 led Russia to seek its own role in international relations. On the other hand, after the Asian Currency Crisis, ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea have been pursuing the problem solving mechanism which is not led by United States. Russia-ASEAN relations entered a new era with Russia's signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in November 2004. To Russia ASEAN is an “electoral district” to be recognized as a vital member of the Asian Pacific community.
著者
加藤 美保子
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
研究活動スタート支援
巻号頁・発行日
2011

2006年以降、ロシアは政治・経済関係を多角化することによって、中国中心のアジア戦略から「太平洋のロシア」戦略へ移行しつつある。本研究は、米国のアジア・シフトと中国による南シナ海や北極海への進出によるサブリージョン・レベルの緊張の高まりによって、ロシアの地政学的関心が大陸から沿岸・海洋へ拡大しつつあると同時に、日本やベトナムなどの地域諸国がロシアの戦略的価値を再認識している点も指摘した。