著者

坂口 太助

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.119, no.10, pp.1718-1742, 2010-10-20 (Released:2017-12-01)

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Japan lost more than eighty percent of its vessels during the Pacific War (1941-1945), mostly due to submarine attacks. These massive losses caused not only the interruption of maritime communications, but also greatly contributed to the collapse of the Japan economy. Within the research to date, it has been pointed out that the Imperial Japanese Navy did not establish a command dedicated to protecting maritime communications until November 1943, leading to the conclusion that the prime cause of the massive losses was the Navy's focus on front line battles rather than protecting maritime communications. However, the author of this article argues that this research has not paid enough attention to the process by which the General Escort Command was formed and proceeds to reexamine that process and the Navy's response to the maritime communications issue through the perceptions of the Japanese government and Imperial Army. The number of vessels lost between December 1941 and March 1943 exceeded the prewar estimate. However, many of these losses were sustained in transport operations to the front; and the number of vessels destroyed by submarine attack while transporting resources back to the homeland was below expectations. Lacking one large fleet like an escort command at that time, the response of the Navy to Allied submarines was to assign groups of smaller units to each area. Rather than submarine attacks, it was the situation at the front that was more closely related to the loss of vessels, due to requisitions by both the Navy and the Army for vessels to replace ships lost at the front. The author argues that this was the main factor in the decrease of vessels available for transporting resources. The government, Army and Navy all attached their highest priorities to establishing dominance at the front and the promotion of building new ships. After the Allied Forces' counteroffensive and the commercial destruction being caused by submarines became more and more evident, the Navy decided to review its organization for protecting maritime communications and consequently established the General Escort Command to control existing units. According to the trends of vessel loss during the war, it is clear that organizing a special command had not been necessary until the spring of 1943. Therefore, the author concludes that the focus on the front did not necessarily mean slighting maritime communications and that the Navy responded to the issue at the appropriate time.

著者

坂口 太助

出版者

日本大学史学会

雑誌

史叢 (ISSN:03869423)

巻号頁・発行日

no.94, pp.21-36, 2016-03

著者

坂口 太助

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.119, no.10, pp.1718-1742, 2010-10-20

---

Japan lost more than eighty percent of its vessels during the Pacific War (1941-1945), mostly due to submarine attacks. These massive losses caused not only the interruption of maritime communications, but also greatly contributed to the collapse of the Japan economy. Within the research to date, it has been pointed out that the Imperial Japanese Navy did not establish a command dedicated to protecting maritime communications until November 1943, leading to the conclusion that the prime cause of the massive losses was the Navy's focus on front line battles rather than protecting maritime communications. However, the author of this article argues that this research has not paid enough attention to the process by which the General Escort Command was formed and proceeds to reexamine that process and the Navy's response to the maritime communications issue through the perceptions of the Japanese government and Imperial Army. The number of vessels lost between December 1941 and March 1943 exceeded the prewar estimate. However, many of these losses were sustained in transport operations to the front; and the number of vessels destroyed by submarine attack while transporting resources back to the homeland was below expectations. Lacking one large fleet like an escort command at that time, the response of the Navy to Allied submarines was to assign groups of smaller units to each area. Rather than submarine attacks, it was the situation at the front that was more closely related to the loss of vessels, due to requisitions by both the Navy and the Army for vessels to replace ships lost at the front. The author argues that this was the main factor in the decrease of vessels available for transporting resources. The government, Army and Navy all attached their highest priorities to establishing dominance at the front and the promotion of building new ships. After the Allied Forces' counteroffensive and the commercial destruction being caused by submarines became more and more evident, the Navy decided to review its organization for protecting maritime communications and consequently established the General Escort Command to control existing units. According to the trends of vessel loss during the war, it is clear that organizing a special command had not been necessary until the spring of 1943. Therefore, the author concludes that the focus on the front did not necessarily mean slighting maritime communications and that the Navy responded to the issue at the appropriate time.