著者
小川 祐輔
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.81-96, 2020 (Released:2020-04-11)
参考文献数
45

This paper discusses John McDowell's disjunctivism. Through the Argument from Illusion, many philosophers have accepted that subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experiences share an underlying mental state (a highest common factor). McDowell, by contrast, thinks of this conception of experience as problematic, developing disjunctivism, which claims that a veridical experience and a corresponding delusive one need not be taken as having a common state-even if they are indistinguishable from one another. However, his writings are difficult to read, so that his thought on disjunctivism, it seems, is still not properly understood or evaluated. Given that the validity of disjunctivism is an important topic in the philosophy of perception, and given that McDowell is one of the standard-bearers of the position, such a situation would be quite unsatisfactory. Therefore, in this paper I work on two things: namely, I try first to give an interpretation of his relevant thought, and then to reveal its significance.
著者
小川 祐輔
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.1, pp.41-57, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)
参考文献数
28

In this paper, I evaluate Donald Davidson's strategy to escape from “mediational epistemology (ME)”. He presents a critical argument against the crucial idea of ME that conceives of our empirical beliefs as depending on mental intermediaries that convey information to our minds. However, it seems that Davidson shares “inside/outside picture” with ME, and this fact leads him into the wrong direction. After reviewing his approach, I explain which role the picture in question plays within his strategy and argue that, in order to escape from ME satisfactorily, we have to question this picture itself.