著者

小野田 竜一 高橋 伸幸

出版者

日本社会心理学会

雑誌

社会心理学研究 (ISSN:09161503)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.2, pp.65-74, 2013

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When people behave more cooperatively toward in-group members than to out-group members, we call it "in-group favoring behavior." However, previous studies have not yet provided a satisfactory explanation for why in-group favoritism can be adaptive. In the current study, we conducted a series of simulations to explain such behaviors from an evolutionary perspective. We used the giving game and constructed a society composed of two groups, A and B. In the game, every player was given a fixed amount of resources and decided how much and to whom he gave. The results showed that the in-group favoring strategy is adaptive only when it has a strict criterion for recipients (not giving any resources to players who had helped other players who did not adopt the in-group favoring strategy). Furthermore, they showed that there were other strategies which have a strict criterion for recipients that could be adaptive as well. These findings suggest that strategies which form a circle of exchange only among themselves by excluding other strategies can be adaptive.

著者

舘石 和香葉 小野田 竜一 高橋 伸幸

出版者

日本社会心理学会

雑誌

社会心理学研究 (ISSN:09161503)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.3, pp.96-103, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

14

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Whether engaging in costly punishment can be an adaptive strategy by enhancing the punisher’s reputation is a crucial question in efforts to explain punishment behaviors. However, empirical findings on this question are mixed. Based on Raihani and Bshary’s (2015) argument, the current study empirically examined the possibility that how a punisher’s motives are estimated affects the reputation of the punisher. We employed a vignette experiment which was designed to make it simple for respondents to estimate each punisher’s motives. Each vignette described a defector in a social dilemma and a punisher who punished the defector using one of four types of punishment. Respondents then estimated the punisher’s motives and evaluated their impressions. The results revealed that the estimated motives depended on the type of punishment which the punishers utilized and that evaluations of punishers varied across the four types of punishment. Thus, the context in which punishment is employed may affect a punisher’s reputation, and this in turn might ultimately determine whether engaging in punishment is adaptive.

著者

小野田 竜一 高橋 伸幸

出版者

日本社会心理学会

雑誌

社会心理学研究 (ISSN:09161503)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.2, pp.65-74, 2013-11-30 (Released:2017-02-27)

被引用文献数

1

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When people behave more cooperatively toward in-group members than to out-group members, we call it "in-group favoring behavior." However, previous studies have not yet provided a satisfactory explanation for why in-group favoritism can be adaptive. In the current study, we conducted a series of simulations to explain such behaviors from an evolutionary perspective. We used the giving game and constructed a society composed of two groups, A and B. In the game, every player was given a fixed amount of resources and decided how much and to whom he gave. The results showed that the in-group favoring strategy is adaptive only when it has a strict criterion for recipients (not giving any resources to players who had helped other players who did not adopt the in-group favoring strategy). Furthermore, they showed that there were other strategies which have a strict criterion for recipients that could be adaptive as well. These findings suggest that strategies which form a circle of exchange only among themselves by excluding other strategies can be adaptive.

著者

小野田 竜一 高橋 伸幸

出版者

日本心理学会

雑誌

心理学研究 (ISSN:00215236)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.87, no.3, pp.240-250, 2016-08