著者

平岩 俊司

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.25-42, 2007-07-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

14

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In October 2006, North Korea went ahead with nuclear tests in spite of international opposition.The international community had made every effort to stop North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, but these efforts ended in failure. This study seeks to look at the measures the international community had been taking to control North Korea’s nuclear program, analyze why the measures could not work effectively, and examine future problems in controlling North Korean nuclear activity.The first North Korean nuclear crisis took place in the early 1990s, and ended when the United States and North Korea signed a bilateral Agreed Framework following their negotiations in1994. North Korea agreed to abandon its original nuclear development program on the condition that the world community provided light-water reactors, which were considered to be relatively difficult to divert to military use. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization(KEDO) was formed with Japan, the United States and South Korea as the primary members to implement the supply of light-water reactors. These efforts paved the way for the rest of the world to control North Korea’s nuclear activities. In 2002, however, the second nuclear crisis occurred. North Korea made it known that it was proceeding with a program to produce highly enriched uranium. Subsequently, the international community launched six-party talks involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Japan, China and Russia, with the intention of preventing North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. In October 2006, North Korea conducted nuclear tests in the face of worldwide opposition. The global society failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear activities.International efforts were not sufficient to deal with the first nuclear crisis, although North Korea’s nuclear activities were controlled to a certain extent via the agreement with the United States. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are intended to counter US threats. If the US–North Korean agreement had not been reached, North Korea’s nuclear activities would not have been controlled within any framework. The current ongoing six-party talks will not produce dramatic results unless bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea make remarkable progress. The six-party talks have the possibility of acting as an essential framework to maintain East Asian security, as well as managing North Korean nuclear issues. However, the immediate problem is controlling North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Given this situation, the six-party talks will function only when the bilateral framework between the United States and North Korea works. Once this development has taken place, the six-party talks will then be able to function as a broader framework for further negotiation.

著者

伊豆見 元 平岩 俊司

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.106, pp.149-161,L15, 1994-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

29

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between the withdrawal of Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) which was completed in 1958 and the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base. When compared with the U. S. forces still stationed in South Korea, the CPVA withdrawal progressed smoothly upon Chinese-North Korean agreement. The CPVA withdrawal was implemented in two stage, in 1954-1955 and 1958, and suspended in 1956-1957. Why suspended in 1956-1957? According to the Chinese explanation, it was suspended upon Chinese-North Korean agreement with the shakeup within the socialist camp after the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in the background. However, 1956 and 1957 was a period in which Kim Il Sung established his own power base by purgeing the Chinese and Soviet factions within North Korea. In 1956, China suspended the withdrawal of CPVA to pressure Kim Il Sung who trying to eliminate the Chinese faction within North Korea. However, Kim Il Sung has almost completed purging the main members of the Chinese faction by the end of 1957. In 1958, China who judged that the revival of the Chinese faction was difficult, completely withdrew the CPVA to maintain good relations with North Korea. Afterwards, Kim Il Sung continued his all-out purge of the Chinese faction and established his power base. Therefore, the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base and the timing of the CPVA withdrawal was closely connected. Afterwards, North Korea and China maintained good relations, but it was a delicate relationship between Kim Il Sung and China in the beginning.

著者

平岩 俊司

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.3, pp.8-26, 2010-12-31 (Released:2022-04-14)

著者

鐸木 昌之 後藤 富士男 平岩 俊司 礒崎 敦仁 室岡 鉄夫

出版者

尚美学園大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2009

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北朝鮮(朝鮮民主主義人民共和国)研究の動向を調査し、方法論を再検討した。わが国における北朝鮮政治・経済体制研究の動向や関連図書の発行状況を確認するとともに、韓国や中国、北米地域の北朝鮮研究の動向等の現状について意見聴取、調査を行った。また、新資料の入手に努めるとともに、複数の脱北者へのインタビューによって同証言の有用性と特性を検証した。北朝鮮研究における比較の視点導入についても再検討した。