著者

平間 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.90, pp.169-184, 1989-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

93

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

海人社

雑誌

世界の艦船

巻号頁・発行日

no.684, pp.148-155, 2008-01

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

日本政治経済史学研究所

雑誌

政治経済史学 (ISSN:02864266)

巻号頁・発行日

no.550, pp.1-18, 2012-08

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.1-17, 2007-06-30 (Released:2022-04-20)

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.102, pp.39-54,L7, 1993-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

84

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In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was “welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage.” His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt “who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant.” It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, “the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism.”The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled “The United States Looking Outward, ” published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that “the United States is woefully unready” and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire “a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America.” Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of “the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)” against the day when China “expand her barriers eastward” in “a wave of barbaric invasion.” Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and “your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific”. He instructed “much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man”. Then in September, he wrote article “A Twentieth Century Outlook”, in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the “Yellow Peril.” But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the “Yellow Peril” was not Japan but China.However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the “Yellow Peril” changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote “The Problem of Asia.” In this article, he saw the most pressing “problem” as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four “Maritime States” of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.102, pp.39-54,L7, 1993

---

In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was "welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage." His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt "who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant." It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, "the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism."<br>The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled "The United States Looking Outward, " published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that "the United States is woefully unready" and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire "a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America." Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of "the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)" against the day when China "expand her barriers eastward" in "a wave of barbaric invasion." Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and "your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific". He instructed "much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man". Then in September, he wrote article "A Twentieth Century Outlook", in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the "Yellow Peril." But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the "Yellow Peril" was not Japan but China.<br>However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the "Yellow Peril" changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote "The Problem of Asia." In this article, he saw the most pressing "problem" as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four "Maritime States" of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

太平洋学会

雑誌

太平洋学会 (ISSN:03874745)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, no.3, pp.104-98, 1998-10

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

海人社

雑誌

世界の艦船

巻号頁・発行日

no.558, pp.70-75, 1999-10

著者

平間洋一 イアン・ガウ 波多野澄雄編

出版者

東京大学出版会

巻号頁・発行日

2001

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

中央公論新社

雑誌

中央公論 (ISSN:05296838)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.106, no.6, pp.p126-134, 1991-06

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

潮書房

雑誌

丸

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.8, pp.98-103, 2000-08

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

公益財団法人史学会

雑誌

史學雜誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.100, no.6, pp.1103-1114, 1193-1192, 1991-06-20

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During negotiations over the twenty-one demands in put to China, Britain had more interest in China than America. However, the attitude of Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, towards Japan was very passive and one of extreme caution, since he wanted to avoid any breach with the Japanese. Therefore, he did not give the Chinese any hint of support. However, Grey proposed that Japan should refrain from advancing any demands that could be considered to compromise the integrity or independence of China as it would be hard to "reconcile such demands with the terms of the Alliance" But, Grey's cautious approach was ignored by Foreign Minister Takaaki Kato. Kato's adopted such an aggressive stance despite the opposition of the Genro (the Emperor's supreme adviser), politicians in the Diet, the press, and a combination of militaristic pressure and nationalist opinion. Although Kato needed Britain as an ally during the negotiations with China, Grey's telegram of warning did not put any pressure on him and his attitude did not change. One of the aims of this paper is to add some background to the reason why from a military point of view. Kato continued such a strong and agressive attitude towards Britain. At this time, Britain was in a desperate position given the threat of a German breakthrough on the Western Front, while the Central powers were forcing a Russian retreat in the east. At this crucial stage in the war, the Japanese navy continued to render valuable assistance in the search of German ships, in the protection of trade, in the convoy of troops, and in helping the allies with material assistance in the conduct of the war by supplying arms and ammunition. Under such military circumstances, Japanese assistance was essential to British success, so it was desirable not to antagonize Japan. This paper's second view point concerns the influence of the Japanese Naval assistance in violatating the Indian garrison of Singapore, and Kato's "psychological moment" in convection with this incident. Prior to the twenty-one demands and the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore, there was already tremendous friction between Kato and Grey. Kato was annoyed at Grey attempt to place strict limits on Japanese military and naval operations in China and the Pacific. Furthermore, Grey proposed that Japan be controlled by a combined French, Russian and British operation. Kato was able to reject Britain's proposals because of Britain's precarious situation in the war. Britain had to change herself geographically for Japan, because of a desperate situation. Britain had to request the dispatch of a cruiser to North America, another three weeks later for the Indian Ocean, and still another one month later for the Dardanelles. Britain's weak position at the time goes some way towards explaining "the bulldozer tactics" of Kato. During this critical situation, the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore occurred and negotiations over the twenty-one demands began. The Navy sent the cruisers Tushima and Otowa to Singapore and rendered "Admirable and effective" assistance. Because of the Japanese assistance of arms and ammunitions, protecting convoys and chasing German merchant cruisers, Grey sent seven telegrams of appreciation for the Japanese assistances. Further, he acknowledged in three telegrams the dispatch of the cruiser Ibuki for convoy escort, three cruisers for the American Squadron chasing the German Far-East Squadron, and for the rescue operation of a merchant ship in the Indian Ocean. Such a continuous stream of telegrams must have provided Kato's "psychological moment" support for his agressive attitude toward Britain. Further, the weakness shown when Britain had to kill 50 Indian soldiers in her own colony gave Kato confidence to maintain his diplomatic independence and to keep his position in the cabinet despite strong opposition from the Genro and the press.