著者
庄司 潤一郎
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_125-170_140, 2012-10-25 (Released:2014-10-26)
参考文献数
73

It is often the case that when economic ties expand through trade, and the exchange of people expands, diplomacy will also take a favorable turn. However, in terms of the Japan-China relationship, which is symbolized by “cold political relations but hot economical relations,” such progress is not occurring. Because of incidents such as the collision of fishing boats off the coast of the Senkaku Islands, political tensions do not seem to be withering. Both Japan and China admit that the reason for this is the existence of the historical perception issue. However, until the 1970s, the historical perception issue was a domestic Japanese issue rather than a pending problem between Japan and China; but in 1982, with the textbook incident, it became an international issue. During this process, both the Japanese and Chinese governments have made certain political “compromises,” but this has instead stimulated domestic radical claims and both nations strengthening their nationalism, and this has created the structure of a vicious cycle. Furthermore, in the background, a composition was made involving the “politicization” of the historical perceptions of both countries and the “asymmetry” of respecting Chinese claims. Moreover, in recent years, the downturn of Japan and the rise of China have been making the historical perception issue more complex. In other words, the historical situation that Japan and China have never experienced coexistence as great powers, has been promoting a sense of mutual rivalry,which has undeniably led to the historical perception issue becoming more complicated. The historical perception issue has become a complex phenomenon as a result of its expansion in both countries after the textbook incident, such that the issue spans several dimensions of political diplomacy, academic research,and national sentiment; and it is becoming difficult to discuss it only within the framework of each government’s diplomacy. Therefore, it is necessary to work on the historical perception issue not only by considering diplomacy,but also by keeping watch on the achievements of academic research and on public opinion in both countries.
著者
庄司 潤一郎
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1995, no.109, pp.54-69,L8, 1995-05-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
93

At the beginning of 1945 American forces landed in the Philippines and Manila fell. As the war situation grew still more desperate, Konoe Fumimaro attended the court on February 14 for the first time in over three years and presented a long memorial to the Throne. In this memorial Konoe adomitted that defeat was inevitable but reasoned that defeat itself did not necessarily mean the end of the national polity, as the real threat was a communist revolution which could occur as a result of defeat. Therefore Konoe concluded that Japan should seek to terminate the war as immediately as possible.Until now studies about this memorial have focused mainly on his fear against the danger of a communist revolution. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to reexamine his aim in this memorial.Not only Konoe but also the Jushin, Hiranuma, Kido, and Wakatsuki, had strongly expressed the same view. It is natural that the ruling class has such feeling, and Konoe, who was a prince, has been frightened by the fear of a communist revolution from his youth.Konoe also stressed that the Manchurian Incident and Sino-Japanese War and their expansion into the Pacific War were skillfully plotted by one group within the army which have long time aimed at a communist revolution. But Konoe was strongly influenced by Ueda Shunkichi, Yosida Shigeru, and other some adherents of Kodoha, who had helped draft this memorial to begin to hold this conspiracy. Moreover this idea has been developed and intensified by his strong anger toward the army, which regarded his detachment as negativism and watched him with deep suspicion, the Sorge Incident, and his political motive to attempt a Kodoha revival.More noteworthy is Konoe's grasp of the international scene. On the one hand he pointed out that the Soviet Union was pushing revolution not only in Europe but also in East Asia. On the other hand he observed that America and Britain had not yet decided over forcing Japan to abolish the national polity. Through obtaining much accurate information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and other channels, he was somewhat optimistic about American opinion. Amongst his contacts, Ogata Shoji, chief of the second section of the Investigation Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, played a most important role by talking and submitting the memorandum to Konoe about the international situation.In particular Konoe was very sensitive to the trend about Japan in America and knew well that there were some influential persons like Joseph Grew and Hugh Byas, who understood the position of Konoe and Japan. He concluded that Japan must terminate the war immediately by negotiating with America in order to avoid a communist revolution and to preseve the national polity.Four months later Konoe agreed to go to the Soviet Union as special envoy by the Emperor's entreaty. Though he personally distrusted the Soviet Union, he had one secret plan to negotiate directly with America using this chance. But his plan was not realized, as the Soviet Union did not accept the Konoe mission.
著者
庄司 潤一郎
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2004, no.139, pp.125-143,L14, 2004-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
66

In a Japan that was becoming increasingly isolated as a result of the Manchurian Incident and its withdrawal from the League of Nations, two noteworthy positions were unfolding, with the goal of seeking a new diplomacy in the mid-1930s. These consisted of the “argument of colonial readjustment”, which was directed at the global community, and the “controversy concerning the propriety of unifying China”, which was directed at China.The “argument of colonial readjustment” reflected the state of global politics at a time when Germany had rearmed itself and occupied the Rhineland while Italy had invaded Ethiopia, and was primarily advocated by the likes of E. House and other politicians and intellectuals in have-nations. This was later submitted by S. Hoare, the British foreign minister, to the League of Nations in 1936 and translated into reality through the establishment of the League of Nations' Committee for the Study of the Problem of Raw Materials in 1937.Thus, this thesis aims to identify the unique elements of the Japanese position relative to those of the West by sifting through the “argument of colonial readjustment” as it had been embraced in the West and analyzing the given position as it had taken root in Japan, where the influence of the argument had been felt. In this connection, the Japanese position was distinct from the positions of Germany and Italy, as well as those of various other western countries, in that the fundamental rule of freedom of commerce was maintained, a new world order was pursued, and the principle behind independence from colonialism was respected. Advocates who had taken up this position in Japan included Fumimaro Konoe, Kiyoshi Kiyosawa, Masamichi Royama, and Tadao Yanaihara.The fact that Japan sought various breakthroughs after withdrawing from the League of Nations has been revealed in recent research findings. This research also takes that position and will analysis the contents of the reconfiguration of the international order according to the “argument of colonial readjustment”.