- 著者
-
渡辺 昭夫
星野 俊也
- 出版者
- 財団法人 日本国際政治学会
- 雑誌
- 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.1997, no.114, pp.57-71,L9, 1997-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
- 参考文献数
- 20
What about regional solutions to regional security questions? After the United Nations has experienced both successes and setbacks in dealing with a series of post-Cold War regional crises, the inter-relationship (or the appropriate balance) between global (i. e. the UN) and regional mechanisms to manage and to help resolve these conficts has become a recurring subject for discussion. And it is especially so in the Asia Pacific region. The rather anomalous security environment of which is exemplified in the duality of “hub-and-spokes”-type bilaterals alliances (à la the US-Japan alliance) and multilateral security frameworks (like the ASEAN regional forum, or ARF).In fact, the tension between global and regional mechanisms, and the applicability thereof, was evidenced from the very beginning of the drafting of the UN Charter. They are both “collective” measures which can involve military options. But they are distinct in that the former can be called, in its ideal form, a system of “collective security” based on the principle of universality and inclusiveness while tha latter, being naturally limited in its membership, can be characterized as that of “collective self-defense.” Conceptually these two logics are supposed to be mutually exclusive, but in reality the function of regional security mechanisms can be found somewhere in the middle ground between collective security and collective self-defense. For example, the post-Cold War NATO has changed the nature of its functions and so has the bilateral alliance between the US and Japan, both of which are assuming the stabilizing role as “public goods” beyond collective self-defense.In the Asia Pacific region, the anomaly of the security environment has not permitted us to envision a region-wide collective security mechanism encompassing all the relevant countries that is firm enough to capture especially commitment from the four regional major powers—the US, China, Russia and Japan. On the other hand, a series of efforts toward what might be called “cooperative security” undertaken regionally which are not predicated on military enforcement do contribute positively to enhance confidence-building. In this period of transition, security in the region will entail a complex of security mechanisms composed of “hub-and-spokes”-type alliances with growing “public goods” role and informal multilateral “cooperative security” dialogue rather than building a hard security regime in the Asia Pacific. Coupled with these developments, however, it would be most productive to pursue concerted diplomacy among the three major powers (the US, China and Japan). It is certainly a long way to draw political contours that fits the Concert of Pacific Asia, but that seems the most plausible option available to these three countries in the twenty-first century.