著者
江口 潜
出版者
新潟産業大学経済学部
雑誌
新潟産業大学経済学部紀要 = BULLETIN OF NIIGATA SANGYO UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF ECONOMICS (ISSN:13411551)
巻号頁・発行日
no.60, pp.59-76, 2022-03

プロ野球選手が「複数年契約」を結ぶならばその後成績は下がるであろうか。本稿はこの問いについて「情報の経済学」の一分野である「エージェンシー理論」に基づいて説明を行い、含意として複数年契約は選手のモラル・ハザードを誘発し、成績低下につながる可能性が高くなることを述べる。その後、実際にはどうであるかということを、複数年契約を結んだ代表的な9選手の打撃成績(打率成績)を用いて実証分析を行う。実証分析の結果としては複数年契約を結んだ後「打率が下がっている」と言えるかどうかは統計学的にも判断は難しい結果になっており、仮に「下がっている」と判断されたとしてもその「下がり幅」は(わずか)1分1厘程度である事が示される。またその際の本稿の実証分析の内包する問題点や課題についても言及する。
著者
江口 潜
出版者
日本地域学会
雑誌
地域学研究 (ISSN:02876256)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.95-111, 2019 (Released:2019-10-26)
参考文献数
25

A region or town usually consists of mutually distinctive, heterogeneous areas or districts, such as “uptown” and “downtown,” or “East” and “West” of a river. In addition, it is common for local public goods/services for residents of such a region to be produced in a facility, like an incinerator, that is constructed in one of these distinctive areas within the region. Although local pubic goods/services produced at the facility are consumed equally by all residents of the region, some of these production costs, especially environmental costs, such as a noisy environment around the facility, are owed solely by the residents of the area in which the facility is sited but none are owed by those living in other areas. For this reason, when a government plans to construct a facility that produces local public goods/services in a region, a controversy often arises among residents about which area of the region the facility should be sited in. Residents usually agree on the necessity for a facility but oppose the siting of the facility in the area in which they reside, which makes the siting decision difficult. This type of difficulty in the siting decision of a public facility is called the “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) problem. Examples of public facilities generating the NIMBY problem include airports, public schools, and places to dispose of household trash within a community, thus, every region or town inevitably faces this problem. Therefore, it is an important task for researchers in regional sicence/urban economics to investigate this problem. In this study, we apply a duopoly model with vertical product differentiation of Motta (1993, Journal of Industrial Economics) to a region that has two heterogeneous residential areas, such as uptown and downtown, which constitute the residential market (i.e., rental housing market). In addition, we investigate how the residents of each area having heterogenous preferences for the environment of the residential area constitute their opinions when a NIMBY facility that inevitably worthens the environment of the sited area is going to be built in either of the two areas. The main results obtained are as follows. First, the opinions of the residents for the question of which area a NIMBY facility to be built are heterogeneous in both residential areas. Second, under some usual conditions, more than half of the residents of each area oppose the facility to be sited within the area they live in. These results suggest that a siting of a NIMBY facility brings among related areas a game-theoretic situation in which there is no Nash equilibrium solution in pure strategy, highlighting the difficulty of resolving NIMBY problems.JEL Classifications:D72, R53