2 0 0 0 象徴の考察

著者
築島 謙三
出版者
公益社団法人 日本心理学会
雑誌
心理学研究 (ISSN:00215236)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, no.1, pp.30-38, 1949

&ldquo;The term symbolism covers a great variety of apparently dissimilar modes of behavior&rdquo; says E. Sapir and he however, distinguishes two charactertics as emerging constantly amid those various senses in which the word is used i.e. referring to the meaning, there being no natural relation between the meaning and the meant and expressing a condensation of energy its actual significance being out of all proportion to that suggested directly by its mere form. It follows then that we have both referential symbolism and condensation symbolism. In its original sense, the symbolism he thinks is restricted to the former sort. Leslie A. White holds the same concept and he insists upon the great significance of the symbolic process as the striking mark that distinguishes man from animal. E. Cassirer's latest book (&ldquo;An Essay on Man&rdquo;) expounds the same idea by applying numerous facts observed by animal psychologists in U.S.A. such as K&ouml;hler, Yerkes and speaks emphatically ahout the incapacity of handling words of the anthropoid apes. And he says there is abundant evidence that various other types of sign process than the symbolic are of frequent occurrence and function effectively in the chimpanzee. The logical analysis of human speech always leads us to an element of prime importance which has no parallel in the animal world. And so I think we can say without a big mistake that the principle of symbolism, with its universal validity and general applicability. give access to the specifically human world and to the world of human culture.<br>The birth of the referential symbolism in man the character of which has thus been clarified in comparison cf man and animal, is explained by G. H. Mead as follows. It is through the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself that the symbol becomes significant. Signification is not confined to the particular situation within which an indindual is given. It requires universal meaing. How does this generalization arise? It mast take place through the individual generalizing himself in his attitude of the other. A child acquires the sense of property through taking what may be called the attitude of the generalized other. These attitudes which all assume in given conditions and over against the same objects become for him attitudes which everyone assumes. So, the generalization is simply the result of the identity of responses.<br>Mead thinks that the basis of symbolism lies in the ability to be the other at the same time that he is himself. But is it not correct to explain that to be the other at the same time that he is himself is itself the symbolic functioning? That a child, being a member of a certain group, can have the same behavior as that of all, shows at the same time that he has caught so-called quasi-universality, as far as he is restricted by the field he is in. To catch this quasi-universality and to catch the true universality freed from space and time are not the same, I believe. It is not evident that the former necessarily leads to the latter. To reach the former by way of the latter is itself the operation of the symbolic thought. To relate both to each other is possible only by the mind that can conceive the universal meaning. H. B. Helson too who says that a concrete thinking may happen to lead an abstract thinking and an abstrant thinking may happen to suggest a concrete thinking does not think that there is a causal relation between both. This is clear also from his other words: Our intuition functions on an abstract place and our reasoning has as firm a hold on us on the abstract level as if we were convinced of the truth of a visual perception.<br>Psychological principles valid for the concrete, easily geometrized type of problem are also applicable to thinking about problems in abstract symbolic terms.&rdquo;<br>Thus symbolic thinking, that makes one thing mean another is deeply in human being. &ldquo;To make mean&rdquo; is the kernel
著者
築島 謙三
出版者
日本文化人類学会
雑誌
民族學研究 (ISSN:00215023)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.15, no.1, pp.41-51, 1950

Kroeber insisted on man's "social" nature-a trait which distinguishes him from animals. Sapir doubted this, and thus the problem of why man is essentially "social" still remains. Here lies a psychological issue, which in recent years has given rise to emphasis on the concepts of symbol and sign. The existence of culture is necessarily connected with the symbolic faculty, as White has ponited out. But White does not explore the final implications of this. When we consider the creative development of culure by Homo sapiens and when we consider the psychological nature of the symbolic faculty, we cannot but admit the creative power of this symbolic faculty. In this faculty of using the symbol we see likewise the faculty of creating the symbol. White regards man as a constant ; culture as an independent variable. We see, however, that men are not really constant because of their unique psychological creative faculty. Enculturation into a given culture depends essentially on the exercise of this faculty. It seems we are obliged at least in principle to admit that the individual may have the power to change culture, although the cultural stream in the long view appears generally so determining that the individual seems powerless. Obviously we cannot neglect the concept of the super-individual nature of culture and deny that we are able to study culture as if it were an independent entity. For example, we must know the structure of any culture before we study the process of enculturation of an individual into that culture. The most important inquiry would seem to lie in the area of the interdependence between the individual and cultural process, especially when investigating a small community culture intensively and minutely. Thus we may conclude that culture is not entirely super-individual.