著者

黒崎 輝

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_125-182_139, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)

参考文献数

63

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In the late 1960s, the Japanese government’s Cabinet Research Office secretly investigated Japan’s nuclear weapons capability and then produced a report in 1968. From a technological and financial standpoint, the report concluded that Japan could build a small number of nuclear bombs without difficulty. Meanwhile Prime Minister Eisaku Sato had announced the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” in December 1967, but the Japanese government policy did not explicitly prohibit Japan from possessing a nuclear weapons capability. Relying on the 1968 report and other materials, some published works insisted that the Sato government sought to maintain Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. This article questions the validity of this argument by reexamining the 1968 report and Japan’s atomic energy development in comparison with a U.S. government study from the mid-1960s on nuclear non-proliferation policy toward Japan.Comparison of the analyses of the 1968 report and the U.S. study on Japan’s fissile material production capability reveals that the latter was based on a more realistic scenario of Japan’s nuclear armament than the former. The 1968 report assessed that Japan could build nuclear bombs by using the plutonium produced by a modified Calder Hall reactor purchased from the U.K. because Japan would obtain reprocessing capability in the early 1970s. To do so, however, required Japan to refuse the safeguards stipulated in the 1958 Japan—U.K. atomic energy agreement. The 1968 report found that it would be damaging and unlikely for Japan to consider such a course of action. In contrast, the U.S. study, which also concluded that Japan had the ability to manufacture plutonium bombs, assumed that Japan would construct a heavy-water moderated reactor using safeguards-free natural uranium to evade international safeguards. Unlike the U.S. study, the 1968 report did not explore feasible measures for Japan to build nuclear bombs.This article also argues that the Sato government lacked political determination to develop and maintain Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. In the late 1960s, Japan was acquiring a nuclear weapons capability as a result of its atomic energy development, which did not follow the scenario in the aforementioned U.S. study. The delay in the construction of a reprocessing plant in Tokai Mura illustrated that the Japanese government did not prioritize the development of Japan’s nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, it became more difficult for Japan to go nuclear against the will of the U.S. because in the late 1960s the former deepened its dependence on the latter for atomic energy development. Nevertheless, Japan’s atomic energy complex and national security circles had a common interest in promoting Japan’s atomic energy development as a national policy, and consequently Japan retained its nuclear weapons capability.

著者

黒崎 輝

巻号頁・発行日

no.10,

著者

黒崎 輝

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, pp.77-97, 2008-03-25 (Released:2021-11-06)

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In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, people around the world faced the danger of nuclear holocaust. The US and the USSR, having acquired the hydrogen bombs, were developing the ballistic missiles such as ICBMs and SLBMs. Against the backdrop of the détente after Stalin’s death, the two nuclear powers were apparently stuck in nuclear stalemate. It, however, came into question if uncontrolled nuclear arms race would automatically lead to stable mutual deterrence between the two nations in view of the rapid technological evolution of their nuclear arsenals. How to manage the transition to stable mutual deterrence, thus, became a major issue of concern for such emerging fields of research as strategic and arms control studies in the US.This article focuses on the Pugwash Conferences and the role that American scientists played in the transnational non-governmental organization’s pursuit of disarmament under such circumstances; it is also an attempt to reconsider the history of the nuclear age from transnational perspectives. The Pugwash Conferences was organized in 1957, to provide a forum for scientists from the East and the West to discuss issues concerned with peace and security of the world during the Cold War. In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the major topic of discussion was disarmament. Especially the reduction of nuclear danger and the prevention of a nuclear war were considered to be urgent. By the time the first conference was convened, however, distrust between the East and the West was so deep that nuclear disarmament seemed to be infeasible both technically and politically. Scientists could not ignore the formidable reality.In the early 1960s, minimum deterrence became one of the most contentious issues between American and Soviet scientists at the Pugwash conferences in relation to general and complete disarmament (GCD). Some American scientists, considering minimum deterrence as desirable and feasible to prevent a nuclear war and to restrain nuclear arms race in the interim, proposed disarmament schemes based on the concept. On the other hand, Soviet participants supported their government’s GCD proposal, opposing to nuclear deterrence intransigently. Although it was after the USSR’s concession to the West on GCD that Soviet scientists accepted minimum deterrence, American scientists helped create broad support for minimum deterrence by introducing it to and providing its logical and political foundations at the conferences.Consequently, the Pugwash Conferences came to seek ways to live with nuclear weapons, while striving to ease distrust between the East and the West. In fact, the Pugwash Conferences supported American-Soviet collaboration to form and maintain a strategic arms control regime based on the concept of mutual assured destruction during the Cold War. Nevertheless, nuclear arms race did not stop under the security framework. This was a disappointment for many scientists who were involved in the Pugwash movement, though humankind survived the Cold War. After all, the nuclear age is far from over even today. Ironically, however, American scientists’intellectual struggle to pursue the challenging goals without yielding to despair would remain worth remembering, unless we are set free from the nuclear threats.

著者

中島 信吾 黒崎 輝 楠 綾子

出版者

中央公論新社

雑誌

中央公論 (ISSN:05296838)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.126, no.11, pp.120-123, 2011-10

著者

黒崎 輝

出版者

東北大学

雑誌

法学 (ISSN:03855082)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.1, pp.94-130, 2000-04