著者

平松 毅

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

日本法政学会法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, pp.50-57, 1994-05-15

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1.Introduction 2.The content of political ethics in local government. 3.Governor, mayor and local assemblyman under obligation to avoid conflict of interest 4.Responsibility and Answerability of governor, mayor and local assemblyman 5.Ordinance to make bovernor, mayor and local assemblyman's assets public and possibility of invasion of his/her privacy 6.In conclusion

著者

池田 十吾

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

日本法政学会法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, pp.150-156, 1989-05-20

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As the year 1941 wore on, it become obvious that war was inevitable. The decision on the part of the militarists, who were now definitely in the sadle, was cool and calculated. But, the Japanese miscalculated. In this delusion the Japanese showed themselves to be so blinded by their own nationalistic and militaristic propagand. The Japanese started the war with a successful attack on Peal Harbor at dawn on Sunday, December 8, 1941. The Japanese attitude was no more surprising than the resolution and skill with which the Americans started about the task of turning the page for the Japanese. All too often in recent years the United States has not been prepared for the responsibilities which world leadership has forced upon her, but she was ready for the task in Japan. For years the State Department had been preparing for the problems of post-war Japan, and in the months preceding the surrender an over-all American policy had been agreed upon through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. Drawn up by experts, especially Dr. Hugh Borton, unhampered by external political pressures, this policy showed the mark of true statemanship. It was based on the realization that a policy of revenge would only breed harted and unrest. The most important reform of occupational policy was theory concerned the position of the emperor. Many Americans had advocated the trial of the reigning emperor as the major war criminal and the abolition of the monarchy by force. However, Dr. Borton would have thought neither wise nor just. The Potsdom proclamation had promised that the future government of Japan would be "established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people", the vast majority of the Japanese continued to venerate the emperor. Moreover, they were aware that the he personally should not be held responsible for the war.

著者

池田 実

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

日本法政学会法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.64-81, 1993-05-15

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Introduction 1. Legislative process 2. Constitutional reform 3. Senate as the chamber of territorial representation Conclusion The 1978 Constitution of Spain calls the Senate "the chamber of territorial representation", but actually it is only partly the case. This paper refers to the functions and powers of the Senate in relation to the legislative process, constitutional reform, and the autonomous communities in order to make out the real character of the Senate and raison d'etre of contemporary bicameral system.

著者

文 聖漢

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

日本法政学会法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.10-21, 1998-11

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1.Introduction 2.Debate on the Japan's national security before the Korean War and the change of the international security environment 3.Debate on the Japan's national security after the outbreak of the Korean War and the change of response by Yoshida cabinet 4.The change of public opinion over the national security 5.Conclusion The main purpose of this paper is to make clear the following three points by which the influence of the Korean War towards the variation of Japan's debate over national security. Firstly, until before the outbreak of the Korean War, there was flourishing debate on the Japanese national security under the assumption that the sovereignty were achieved by reaching the Peace Treaty. The focal point of the debate was the feasibility of neutral policy as Japan'sp ossible security policy options, event hought Japan was then under the occupation of the United States. Secondly, even thought Japanese political orientation after the defeat of war was explicitly inclined towards the neutral policy for various reasons, the public opinion supported in general the Yoshida's security policy, the so called Yoshida doctrine, which focused on the indispensability of limited dependence on the united states. It also included implicitly the pursuit of economic reconstruction, gradual rearmament corresponding to the economic capacity, and the offering of military bases to the UnitedS tates. In addition, some nationalistsw ho insisted on the drastic rearmament got sympathetic assistance to some extent from the general public. Thirdly, once the Korean War broke out, the direction of debate over the national security issue, being held independently in domestic, turned the other way. The arguments of neutrality and over-all peace treaty lost their theoretical bases and so did in reality. Yoshida's cabinet got the political legitimacy of its dependence policy on the United States. This also helped Yoshida pursue his national security policy with confidence. Furthermore, the Korean War made it possible for the Japanese latent consciousness on the national security to be awakened and become more realistic.In conclusion, the U.S.-Japanese alliance was not the by-product stemmed from the change of international situation which originated from the Korean War, but the result of independent debate which was domestically already full fledged on the stage of discussion before the outbreak of the Korean War. Summing up, the old 'theory of Kamikaze of the Korean War', which treats the Korean War as the decisive factor forming Japanese-U.S. security system and rearmament of Japan, has gone too far in emphasizing the outside factors in the formation of Japan's foreign policy. This theory is dependent only on the textual interpretation.

著者

神谷 義郎

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

日本法政学会法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.3-4, 1987-05-20

著者

長谷 卓巳

出版者

日本法政学会

雑誌

日本法政学会法政論叢 (ISSN:03865266)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, pp.99-109, 1988-05-20

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In 1962 the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council to prepare a draft declaration and convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. On 20 November 1963 the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Third Committee, proclaimed the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and on 21 December 1965 the General Assembly at its twentieth session adopted by 106 votes to 0, with 1 abstention, Mexico and opened for signature and ratification the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The principles set out in the Declaration are reaffirmed in the Convention, and the Convention was prepared in order to give effect to the principles proclaimed in the Declaration. The Convention entered into force on 4 January 1969, thirty days after the twenty-seventh instrument of ratification or accession was deposited(Art. 19). A direct cause that induced the United Nations to take up the serious question of racial discrimination was the revival of anti-Semitic and neo-nazi movements in different parts of the world in 1959/1960. This Convention consists of 25 operative articles besides the preamble, and they are divided into 3 parts. Part I of the Convention(Arts. 1 to 7)refers to Substantive Article. Article I of the Convention begins with a definition of racial discrimination as "distinction, exclusion, restriction of preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic orgin…, "and Article 2 sets forth the fundamental obligations of States Parties to undertake in the matter of racial discrimination. Some of these fundamental obligations are elaborated in greater detail in Article 3 to 7. Part II of the Convention(Arts. 8 to 16)deals with measures of implementation. Remarkable among these clauses are provisions on the establishment of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination("the Committee"). Measures for the implementation of the Convention include the establishment of the Committee, consisting of "18 experts of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality elected by States Parties from amongst their nationals who shall serve in their personal capacity"(Art. 8. 1). Measures of implementation are an essential part of the Convention and consist of three means--(a)the undertaking by States Parties of the obligation to submit reports and the consideration of these reports by the Committee(Art. 9), (b)inter-State complaints between States Parties through the Committee(Arts. 11 to 13), and(c)the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups within the jurisdiction of States Parties claiming to be victims of a violation by that State of any of the rights set forth in the Convention(Art. 14). Part III of the Convention(Arts.17 to 25)is devoted to final clauses-reservations. At any rate, the Convention is the most radical instrument so far adopted in this field. It is described as "the international community's only tool for combating racial discrimination which is at one and the same time universal in reach, comprehensive in scope, legally binding in character, and equipped with built-in measures of implementation"(statement by the Committee at the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination). In addition, an exceptionally large number of States have become parties to it. As of 1 January 1988, 124 States have agreed to be bound by the Convention. However, Japan has not ratified it. We hope that it will be ratified by Japan as soon as possible.