著者

南波 聖太郎

出版者

京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所

雑誌

東南アジア研究 = Japanese Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (ISSN:05638682)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.1, pp.3-38, 2017-07-31

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This paper aims to analyze the process of establishing the liberated zone in Laos, focusing on changes in the strategy of the Pathet Lao (PL) toward the Kingdom of Laos (KL) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The PL, established in Vietnam in 1950, kept changing its strategy for the first decade. The main strategies tried by the PL were as follows. First, for the initial four years the PL tried to gain bases with the military assistance of the DRV but could not return to Laos. Second, in the assembly area provided by the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the PL expelled the KL's forces and established the one-party system of the Lao People's Party. However, despite the economic and political assistance of the DRV, the PL could not afford to sustain the system. Third, the PL handed over the assembly area to the KL when it established the coalition government in 1957. It followed that the PL was forced to move to Vietnam when the coalition collapsed. Thereafter, while the PL engaged in a large military action with the DRV, it could not gain firm bases for more than a year. The PL conquered Samnuea Province in 1960 and named it the liberated zone. The strategy advocated at that time reflected the above experiences. Its points were as follows. One, the PL rethought its strategy of depending heavily on the DRV and put much value on self-reliance. Two, the PL recognized its own military weakness and started a dialogue with the KL. Three, the PL agreed to reestablish the coalition government but did not agree to renounce the liberated zone.

著者

高阪 章

出版者

京都大学東南アジア研究所

雑誌

東南アジア研究 = Japanese journal of Southeast Asian studies (ISSN:05638682)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.134-137, 2016-07

著者

吉川 和希

出版者

京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所

雑誌

東南アジア研究 = Japanese Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (ISSN:05638682)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, no.1, pp.3-30, 2019-07-31

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During the eighteenth century, large numbers of Chinese laborers came to work in mines in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. However, few investigations have been conducted on the responses of native chieftains or the local population to the social fluctuations in this area. Therefore, this article focuses on the survival strategies of native chieftains in the Lang Son region. Investigation of correspondence between the Lê-Trinh government and native chieftains in the Lang Son region reveals that under this government's control, native chieftains were tasked with collecting taxes and drafting soldiers in each commune. They were permitted to receive a portion of these tax revenues as salary and collect various fees via taxation, causing them to perceive these roles as their own vested rights. Meanwhile, during the mid-eighteenth century, the Lang Son region was involved in extensive disturbances that destabilized the native chieftains' political and economic bases. Given this background, the Lê-Trinh government frequently sanctioned the aforementioned rights of native chieftains by issuing official documentation, while the chieftains themselves also requested the government to issue official documents confirming their rights. In fact, they possessed these documents until the colonial era or transcribed them in their genealogies, demonstrating that they recognized them as certifications of their vested rights. Thus, during the eighteenth century, developing relations with the Lê-Trinh government was a survival strategy for native chieftains in the Lang Son region.