- 著者
-
萩原 優騎
- 出版者
- 国際基督教大学
- 雑誌
- 社会科学ジャーナル (ISSN:04542134)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- no.64, pp.191-211[含 英語文要旨], 2008-03
This paper is a sequel to "Reconsidering Paradigm Theory - Philosophy of Science, Social Anthropology, and Lacanian Psychoanalysis -". The purpose of the last paper was to reconsider paradigm theory and deepen an understanding about it in relation with social anthropology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In this paper, we will reflect on philosophy of science psychoanalytically again focusing on Jacques Lacan's concept "discourse of science". Kuhn says that paradigm change is like conversion. This means that paradigm change is a change of intersubjectivity. One of the functions of paradigm is to form a scientific community where scientists study based on knowledge shared intersubjectively. Norwood Russell Hanson also emphasizes the importance of intersubjectivity. He discusses it not only as a key of scientific observation but also as that of a basis of knowledge in Lebenswelt. For example, one may find a goblet in a picture, but the other may find faces of two persons in it. What we find there is determined by how perspective has been formed intersubjectively. To explain Hanson's theory from the view of Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is necessary to consider the structure of the psychoanalytic subject. According to Lacan, stability of the imaginary, which is especially related to the function of ego, is guaranteed by the symbolic. To enter the symbolic means he/she has a relation with language. Intersubjective relations based on language control the imaginary, and this is a necessary condition for the subject to be defined socially. However, it does not mean that symbolic order can perfectly give him/her a truism in his/her daily life. The imperfection of symbolization is usually covered with the imaginary, and the object of fantasy is called "object a". Paradoxically, this object can be evidence that his/her symbolization is imperfect when his/her current perspective loses its truism. Such a structure is characterized by its symbolic imperfection, but discourse of science tries to exclude it. In this discourse everything seems to go perfectly if a chain of signifier starts once. Lacan says that discourse of science is that of mathematical symbols, and it supposes that science always has its perfect objectivity. Scientists describe the world by mathematical symbols, and they prove its validity by experiments. Repeatability of experiments is a representation of object a, because it makes a truism in the concerned paradigm. This is the situation "normal science" named by Kuhn. In this situation they do not think of a possibility of paradigm change. An important question is why paradigm can change though scientists are in discourses of science where symbolic imperfection is not considered. The answer is that they can be in this discourse as long as they live in Lebenswelt which is a basis of their fantasy that the world is constant. The subject in Lebenswelt has a symbolic imperfection, which can bring the possibility of paradigm change. Lacan points out that constancy of the world is a fantasy. Moreover, we cannot find a unique law which explains how paradigm change occurs. The reason why the concerned paradigm is selected is only a rationalized explanation after paradigm change. Paul Feyerabend calls this groundlessness "anything goes", but it tends to be evaluated as an extreme relativism. As mentioned already, Lacanian psychoanalysis explains it as an imperfection of the symbolic. This is "the real", which is a structural groundlessness of the subject.