著者
Takayuki SUZUKI
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.31, pp.55-73, 2022 (Released:2022-10-19)
参考文献数
21
被引用文献数
1

Interesting works on the evolutionary origins of consciousness have been published recently. They are interesting especially because they try to solve the hard problem of consciousness through the study of the evolutionary origins of consciousness. This paper critically examines one of these works, a book by Feinberg and Mallatt. Though it seems that they fail to offer a new and plausible solution to the hard problem of consciousness, studying evolutionary origins remains to be one of the most promising strategies for the naturalization of consciousness.
著者
Yusaku OHKUBO
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.23-41, 2021 (Released:2021-12-14)
参考文献数
44
被引用文献数
1

The history of statistics is filled with many controversies, in which the prime focus has been the difference in the “interpretation of probability” between Frequentist and Bayesian theories. Many philosophical arguments have been elaborated to examine the problems of both theories based on this dichotomized view of statistics, including the well-known stopping-rule problem and the catch-all hypothesis problem. However, there are also several “hybrid” approaches in theory, practice, and philosophical analysis. This poses many fundamental questions. This paper reviews three cases and argues that the interpretation problem of probability is insufficient to begin a philosophical analysis of the current issues in the field of statistics. A novel viewpoint is proposed to examine the relationship between the stopping-rule problem and the catch-all hypothesis problem.
著者
Toshiyasu ARAI
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, pp.45-60, 2018 (Released:2018-11-01)
参考文献数
19

In this paper we propose a semantics in which the truth value of a formula is a pair of elements in a complete Boolean algebra. Through the semantics we can unify largely two proofs of cut-eliminability (Hauptsatz) in classical second order logic calculus, one is due to Takahashi-Prawitz and the other by Maehara.
著者
Satoru SUZUKI
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.2, pp.105-126, 2005-03-05 (Released:2009-03-26)
参考文献数
22
被引用文献数
2 2

Bayesianism has the following two principles. (B1) Any rational belief state can be represented by a probability function. (B2) Any rational belief change can be represented by conditionalisation. Besides (B1) and (B2), Bayesian confirmation theory has the following principle. (B3) Evidence E confirms a theory T ⇔ the probability of T under the condition E is greater than the probability of T. Glymour argues about what he believes is a counterexample to (B3). When we represent by P the belief state of Einstein at a certain time in November 1915 and consider E to be old evidence for the general theory of relativity (GTR), we obtain P (E)=1. Then we obtain (1) P (GTR|E)=P (GTR). On the other hand, according to (B3), we obtain (2) P (GTR|E)>P (GTR). (2) contradicts (1). This is called the old evidence problem. Howson handles it as follows. The belief state of each agent at each time is relativised to the stock of background information which he has at the time. The reason why the old evidence problem arises is that we relativise the belief state of Einstein to the unsuitable stock of background information. Let K be the stock of background information which Einstein had at that time and let P be the probability function which represents the belief state relativised to the stock. When we choose this P in applying (B3), the old evidence problem arises. Let K_??_{(E)} be the result of deleting from K everything in K dependent on E and let P' be the probability function which represents the belief state relativised to K_??_{(E)}. Because P' (E)≠1, the old evidence problem does not arise. But as Chihara criticises, it is not clear what K_??_{(E)} and P' are like. I handle Chihara's criticism in terms of a probabilistic version of AGM theory. AGM theory can describe such types of belief changes as expansion, contraction and revision. I handle the old evidence problem by means of retaining (B1) and (B3) and relaxing (B2) so as to admit the type of belief change which can be represented by the change from P to P', that is, contraction. Following this line of thought, I show that we can consider P' to be the contraction of P with respect to E. Relying mainly on the writings of Gärdenfors and Spohn, I show that we can construct a probabilistic contraction function which generates the contraction of P with respect to E.
著者
Lajos BRONS
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.9-32, 2019 (Released:2019-11-07)
参考文献数
43
被引用文献数
1 7

Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and “defective”) EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules.
著者
Masanao OZAWA
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.11, no.2, pp.107-121, 2003-03-05 (Released:2009-03-26)
参考文献数
15
被引用文献数
1

The argument is re-examined that the program of deriving the rule for the state change caused by a measurement from the Schrödinger equation holding for the object-apparatus composite system falls into a vicious circle or an infinite regress called the von Neumann chain. It is shown that this argument suffers from a physical inconsistency concerning the causality between the process of reading of the outcome in the apparatus and the state change in the measured object caused by the measurement. A consistent argument which accomplishes the above program without falling into the circular argument is presented.
著者
Keisuke YOSHII
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.25, pp.35-44, 2017 (Released:2017-09-07)
参考文献数
22
被引用文献数
1

In the conference of Computability Theory and Foundations of Mathematics 2015, we had special sessions on Professor Kazuyuki Tanaka's work in honor of his 60th birthday. It was a great honor for me to give a talk about determinacy of infinite games in that session. In this paper, accordance with works by Professor Tanaka on determinacy, we introduce a collection of related researches.
著者
Takuo AOYAMA Shogo SHIMIZU Yuki YAMADA
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, pp.1-18, 2015-03-30 (Released:2017-08-31)
参考文献数
19

This paper presents what the authors call the 'divergence problem' regarding choosing between different future possibilities. As is discussed in the first half, the central issue of the problem is the difficulty of temporally locating the 'active cause' on the modal divergent diagram. In the second half of this paper, we discuss the 'second-person freedom' which is, strictly, neither compatibilist negative freedom nor incompatibilist positive freedom. The divergence problem leads us to two hypothetical views (i.e. the view of single-line determination and that of one-off chance), and these views bring humans closer to the afree side - i.e. outside of the contrast between being free and being unfree. The afree side is greatly different from the ordinary human side. This paper tries to secure the second-person freedom as a substitute for the ordinary human freedom while preventing the divergence problem from arising.
著者
Toshiyasu ARAI
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, pp.29-47, 2012-03-25 (Released:2017-08-01)
参考文献数
39
被引用文献数
1

This article is a sneak preview of the project, 'proof theory for theories of ordinals'. Background, aims and survey on the project are given.
著者
Satosi WATANABE
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.7, no.1, pp.1-14, 1986-03-05 (Released:2009-02-16)
参考文献数
8
被引用文献数
1 6

We can recognize at least three types of epistemological relativity. The present paper deals with the logico-linguistic type of relativity, which is exemplified by the grue emerald of Goodman and the ugly duckling of the present author. A general theorem is introduced and proven, which covers all the cases of this type of relativity.
著者
Joel DAVID HAMKINS
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.19, pp.37-55, 2011-05-15 (Released:2017-08-01)
参考文献数
11
被引用文献数
1 4

Set theorists often take their subject as constituting a foundation for the rest of mathematics, in the sense that other abstract mathematical objects can be construed fundamentally as sets. In this way, they regard the set-theoretic universe as the universe of all mathematics. And although many set-theorists affirm the Platonic view that there is just one universe of all sets, nevertheless the most powerful set-theoretic tools developed over the past half century are actually methods of constructing alternative universes. With forcing and other methods, we can now produce diverse models of ZFC set theory having precise, exacting features. The fundamental object of study in set theory has thus become the model of set theory, and the subject consequently begins to exhibit a category-theoretic second-order nature. We have a multiverse of set-theoretic worlds, connected by forcing and large cardinal embeddings like constellations in a dark sky. In this article, I will discuss a few emerging developments illustrating this second-order nature. The work engages pleasantly with various philosophical views on the nature of mathematical existence.
著者
SHIRAI Hisato
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.18, pp.29-43, 2009-11-15

Quantum mechanics is widely believed to be inconsistent with local realism because J.S. Bell proved the contradiction between quantum mechanics and the hidden variable theories based on reality and locality of matter. As described herein, the relation between quantum mechanics and local realism is discussed. This paper presents the question of whether any version of local realism is contradicted by quantum mechanics. The answer is negative. An interpretation is proposed by which the contradiction is explained using physical variables of two types: (1) physical variables of the first type, such as positions and angles (i.e. coordinates), are realistic variables and always possess definite values independently of measurements; (2) those of the second type, such as momenta, angular momenta, and spins (i.e., conserved quantities), are non-realistic variables, which possess no value before measurement. Value definiteness of the first type provides a reliable basis to physical reality of matter, and non-reality of the second type might solve the problem of inconsistency between quantum mechanics and local realism.
著者
KANEKO Hiroshi
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.11, no.1, pp.35-49, 2002-11-25
参考文献数
16
被引用文献数
1 2

It has been the main stream of research into intuitionsim for some decades to try to interpret intuitionist criticism of classical mathematics from a constructive semantic point of view. In such attempts, however, it is impossible to include all intuitionistic tenets, especially Brouwer's criticism of language and communication, in such a semantic framework. Some parts of Brouwer's thoughts thoroughly resist any kind of semantic interpretation. This is similar to Wittgenstein's later philosophy which also does not fit any kind of semantic interpretation, or to interpretations that his philosophy is constructed to exclude any semantic readings. By this comparison I hope to suggest that we have something to learn from Brouwer's philosophy, especially his criticism of language and linguistic communication that resists any semantic readings. In fact, Brouwer exerted influence on peoples such as Hilbert and Weyl for almost two dacades before the beginning of semantic research, that is, before the formulation of intuitionistic logic by Heyting. So, we can raise a legitimate question about what influence Brouwer exerted. Roughly speaking, I think it was his prior insights into the relation between language and mathematics. In the following, I would like to consider what those insights are, what kind of view on language they are based on and how they influence the foundational debates.