著者
Toshiyasu ARAI
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, pp.45-60, 2018 (Released:2018-11-01)
参考文献数
19

In this paper we propose a semantics in which the truth value of a formula is a pair of elements in a complete Boolean algebra. Through the semantics we can unify largely two proofs of cut-eliminability (Hauptsatz) in classical second order logic calculus, one is due to Takahashi-Prawitz and the other by Maehara.
著者
Satoru SUZUKI
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.13, no.2, pp.105-126, 2005-03-05 (Released:2009-03-26)
参考文献数
22
被引用文献数
2 2

Bayesianism has the following two principles. (B1) Any rational belief state can be represented by a probability function. (B2) Any rational belief change can be represented by conditionalisation. Besides (B1) and (B2), Bayesian confirmation theory has the following principle. (B3) Evidence E confirms a theory T ⇔ the probability of T under the condition E is greater than the probability of T. Glymour argues about what he believes is a counterexample to (B3). When we represent by P the belief state of Einstein at a certain time in November 1915 and consider E to be old evidence for the general theory of relativity (GTR), we obtain P (E)=1. Then we obtain (1) P (GTR|E)=P (GTR). On the other hand, according to (B3), we obtain (2) P (GTR|E)>P (GTR). (2) contradicts (1). This is called the old evidence problem. Howson handles it as follows. The belief state of each agent at each time is relativised to the stock of background information which he has at the time. The reason why the old evidence problem arises is that we relativise the belief state of Einstein to the unsuitable stock of background information. Let K be the stock of background information which Einstein had at that time and let P be the probability function which represents the belief state relativised to the stock. When we choose this P in applying (B3), the old evidence problem arises. Let K_??_{(E)} be the result of deleting from K everything in K dependent on E and let P' be the probability function which represents the belief state relativised to K_??_{(E)}. Because P' (E)≠1, the old evidence problem does not arise. But as Chihara criticises, it is not clear what K_??_{(E)} and P' are like. I handle Chihara's criticism in terms of a probabilistic version of AGM theory. AGM theory can describe such types of belief changes as expansion, contraction and revision. I handle the old evidence problem by means of retaining (B1) and (B3) and relaxing (B2) so as to admit the type of belief change which can be represented by the change from P to P', that is, contraction. Following this line of thought, I show that we can consider P' to be the contraction of P with respect to E. Relying mainly on the writings of Gärdenfors and Spohn, I show that we can construct a probabilistic contraction function which generates the contraction of P with respect to E.
著者
Lajos BRONS
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.28, pp.9-32, 2019 (Released:2019-11-07)
参考文献数
43
被引用文献数
1 7

Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and “defective”) EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules.
著者
Masanao OZAWA
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.11, no.2, pp.107-121, 2003-03-05 (Released:2009-03-26)
参考文献数
15
被引用文献数
1

The argument is re-examined that the program of deriving the rule for the state change caused by a measurement from the Schrödinger equation holding for the object-apparatus composite system falls into a vicious circle or an infinite regress called the von Neumann chain. It is shown that this argument suffers from a physical inconsistency concerning the causality between the process of reading of the outcome in the apparatus and the state change in the measured object caused by the measurement. A consistent argument which accomplishes the above program without falling into the circular argument is presented.
著者
Keisuke YOSHII
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.25, pp.35-44, 2017 (Released:2017-09-07)
参考文献数
22
被引用文献数
1

In the conference of Computability Theory and Foundations of Mathematics 2015, we had special sessions on Professor Kazuyuki Tanaka's work in honor of his 60th birthday. It was a great honor for me to give a talk about determinacy of infinite games in that session. In this paper, accordance with works by Professor Tanaka on determinacy, we introduce a collection of related researches.
著者
Takuo AOYAMA Shogo SHIMIZU Yuki YAMADA
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, pp.1-18, 2015-03-30 (Released:2017-08-31)
参考文献数
19

This paper presents what the authors call the 'divergence problem' regarding choosing between different future possibilities. As is discussed in the first half, the central issue of the problem is the difficulty of temporally locating the 'active cause' on the modal divergent diagram. In the second half of this paper, we discuss the 'second-person freedom' which is, strictly, neither compatibilist negative freedom nor incompatibilist positive freedom. The divergence problem leads us to two hypothetical views (i.e. the view of single-line determination and that of one-off chance), and these views bring humans closer to the afree side - i.e. outside of the contrast between being free and being unfree. The afree side is greatly different from the ordinary human side. This paper tries to secure the second-person freedom as a substitute for the ordinary human freedom while preventing the divergence problem from arising.
著者
Toshiyasu ARAI
出版者
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
雑誌
Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, pp.29-47, 2012-03-25 (Released:2017-08-01)
参考文献数
39
被引用文献数
1

This article is a sneak preview of the project, 'proof theory for theories of ordinals'. Background, aims and survey on the project are given.
著者
佐藤 英明
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.23, no.2, pp.79-84, 1996-03-31
参考文献数
12

従来, 絵画的描写は言語的記述と異なり, その対象との間に何らかの「類似性」が存在するものと考えられてきた。だが, N.グッドマンは『芸術の諸言語』において, そのような考え方が誤りであることを指摘し, 言語的記述と絵画的描写との違いは, その記号系が「稠密」か否かに求められるとした。本稿は, このグッドマンの理論の難点を明らかにし, その克服の方途をフッサールの像理論に見いだそうとする試みである。そして, それによって, 逆にフッサールの像理論をグッドマンの理論に基づいて再構成し, そこに「類似性」を考察する新たな視点を求めたい。
著者
植原 亮
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, no.2, pp.77-86, 2008-03-30

This paper aims to examine ethical implications of the cognitive enhancement based on neuroscience and neuro-technology: more specifically, its influences on the "self". In order to do this, I begin with presenting the relevant conception of the self, and then examine how the cognitive enhancement could influence on the self. The opponents of the cognitive enhancement hold that it is self-destructive to accept cognitive enhancement since it will destroy our ordinary practices based on "folk psychology". The proponents, however, may prefer new, neuroscientific practices, which do not need the concept of the self. Yet, the opponents still have ways out, resorting to our system of values. I will end this paper by pointing out some tasks which we must solve.