著者
秋葉 剛史
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.44, no.2, pp.2_115-2_134, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)
参考文献数
11
被引用文献数
2 1

According to the “truthmaker maximalism”, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense.

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勉強中 秋葉剛史「Truthmaker 原理はなぜ制限されるべきか」 https://t.co/TYGzYknL9o

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