著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.261-275, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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The early non-cognitivists in metaethics used to claim that moral sentences such as “torture is wrong” are neither true nor false, because they are merely expressions of our attitudes or emotions. By contrast, more recent non-cognitivists have come to acknowledge that there are in fact moral truths, i.e., moral sentences that are true. This change of view is often defended by appealing to the so-called minimalist or deflationary theory of truth, according to which “true” is simply an expressive device for agreement or endorsement, so that there is nothing more in saying “S is true” than in saying S itself. With this theory on truth in hand, it becomes surely possible for non-cognitivists to recognize the existence of moral truths, since they can sincerely accept some moral sentences. However, in my view this is not an appropriate way for non-cognitivists to accommodate the moral truth. A first difficulty is the problem of “creeping minimalism”, which is to the effect that once non-cognitivists invoke the minimalism about truth, they cannot stop invoking minimalism about other notions (such as belief and fact), so that they end up collapsing into realism. A second difficulty is that the appeal to the truth minimalism makes it difficult for noncognitivists to admit the legitimacy of constitutive explanations about truth in other domains than ethics. A third difficulty is that the appeal to the truth minimalism makes the significance of explanatory project by quasi-realists hardly intelligible. After considering these difficulties, in the final part of the paper I propose an alternative strategy for non-cognitivists. It consists in holding the “functionalism about truth”, according to which truth is a functionally defined and multiply realizable property. By endorsing this view, I argue, non-cognitivists can successfully meet the three difficulties mentioned above, so it is recommended for them to accept it.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.85-90, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)

参考文献数

11

著者

和泉 ちえ 森 一郎 飯田 隆 小手川 正二郎 秋葉 剛史 河野 哲也 笠木 雅史 池田 喬 鈴木 伸国 村上 祐子 大河内 泰樹 佐藤 靜 加藤 泰史 吉原 雅子 小島 優子 菅原 裕輝

出版者

千葉大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2016-04-01

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1.男女共同参画推進および若手研究者支援に関して先駆的取り組みを展開している英国哲学会理事のJoe Morrison博士を日本に招聘し,第76回日本哲学会大会ワークショップ「どう変わる!日本哲学会」(2017年5月21日,於・一橋大学)において啓発的な講演と率直な議論を重ねる機会を企画実践した。またMorrison博士によるレクチャーは,千葉大学,東北大学,京都大学においても開催され,幅広い層の研究者たちと共に議論を深めることができた。特に男女共同参画を確実に実践するために英国哲学会が策定した「Good Practice Scheme」について哲学的視点に基づく論拠をMorrison博士を交えて再検討する機会を得たことは有意義であった。日本の哲学分野における男女共同参画および若手研究者支援に関して,今後も英国哲学会と緊密に連絡を取り合いながら積極的に推進する方針が確認された。2.哲学分野で活動する若手研究者を対象に実施した大規模アンケート結果を分析・公表すると共に,諸方策について提言をとりまとめた。3.日本学術会議総合ジェンダー分科会と協力しながら,日本哲学会大会の時機に合わせた人文・社会科学系学協会男女共同推進連絡会の正式発足会合に向けて実質的な貢献を積み重ねた。また日本学術会議公開シンポジウムにおいても哲学分野における男女共同参画推進・若手研究者支援の取り組みについて報告と提案を行った。4.国際会議「ジェンダー研究と哲学史」(於・一橋大学)を共催開催した。5.若手研究者を対象にした査読論文指導ワークショップを開催した(於・立教大学)。6.日本全国の諸大学における哲学分野の専任教員ポストに関して調査を行った。7.日本哲学会の機関誌『哲学』第69号特別企画「ハラスメントとは何か?ー哲学・倫理学からのアプローチ」を取りまとめ諸論点を提起した。

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_115-2_134, 2011 (Released:2012-06-06)

参考文献数

11

被引用文献数

2 3

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According to the “truthmaker maximalism”, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.87-109, 2022 (Released:2022-04-06)

参考文献数

51

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There is a familiar tension between the two main components of non-reductive physicalism, which are physicalism, on the one hand, and the non-reducibility or autonomy of so-called special sciences (i.e., sciences other than physics), on the other. While it is often claimed that this tension can be satisfactorily resolved by adopting the subset account of realization(defended by e.g., Shoemaker (2001) and Wilson (2011)), this paper challenges that popular view, by elaborating some critical comments by Funkhouser (2014). Then, after examining Funkhouser's own position, this paper proposes a new way of resolving the aforementioned tension, which consists in refining the subset account's analysis of realization on the basis of various dependence relations between causal powers.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.61, pp.149-164_L9, 2010

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According to the widely accepted correspondence theory of truth, each atomic contingent truth has its own truth-maker, i.e., an entity existing in the world that makes contingent proposition true. And at least for the metaphysical realist, the first and obvious candidates for truth-maker are entities called &ldquo;facts&rdquo; or &ldquo;states of affairs&rdquo;. These are entities normally designated by expressions like &ldquo;<i>a</i>'s being <i>F</i>&rdquo; or &ldquo;the fact that <i>a</i> is <i>F</i>&rdquo;.<br>Although it seems natural to assume that states of affairs exist, there is a famous objection to this assumption, known as &ldquo;Bradley's regress&rdquo;. Roughly put, the objection proceeds as follows. The states of affairs are supposed to be complex entities. However, what accounts for the unity of constituents in the state of affairs, say, <i>Fa</i>? If one appeals to the exemplification relation <i>E</i> to bind the constituents <i>a</i> and <i>F</i> together, the explanatory job is not yet finished. For, in that case, the unity of <i>a</i>, <i>F</i>, and <i>E</i> now raises the same problem. It is no use to add further and further exemplification relations <i>E</i>', <i>E</i>'', <i>E</i>'''..., because each time one adds a new relation, one gets only a new explanatory task, and never the unity of <i>a</i> and <i>F</i>. Thus, since the unity of constituents cannot be accounted for, the assumption that states of affairs exist should be regarded as groundless.<br>Against this objection, F. Orilia replies as follows. Though the regress objection above seems to seriously threaten the assumption that states of affairs exist, in fact it does not. For, the thought that there is an infinite explanatory sequence does not involve any inconsistency. As for myself, I agree with him as far as his last claim is concerned, namely the claim that there is no inconsistency in the idea of infinite explanatory sequence. However, I disagree with him as far as the evaluation of the regress objection is concerned. I claim that the alleged explanatory sequence generated in the regress objection is in fact vacant in its explanatory power, and hence that this objection in any way shows the failure of explanatory task.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

北海道大学大学院文学研究科応用倫理研究教育センター

雑誌

応用倫理 (ISSN:18830110)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.12-29, 2016-03-31

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Moral theories generally tell us the right course of action. They deliver practical advices (or a series of commands) about how we should act, so it seems natural for those who sincerely accept a given moral theory to try to figure out, in each case where some practical decision is needed, what the theory recommends, and act accordingly. However, this is not what a moral theory always tells us to do. Certain moral theories in fact tell their followers not to consult them in daily decision-making. The reason for this is simply that if we consciously intend to act as the theories recommend, it would become difficult or even impossible for us to act in that manner. In recent literature, moral theories that satisfy this condition are called selfeffacing, and have attracted some attention. Although quite a few authors seem to endorse the view that this character of self-effacement makes a moral theory highly problematic (or even unacceptable), in this paper I shall argue that this view is ungrounded. To do this, I will critically examine various objections to self-effacing moral theories found in the literature that concern the following points, respectively: lack of action-guidingness; threat of undermining psychological harmony and the desirable form of moral deliberation; an absurd requirement to have mutually contradicting beliefs; and an invitation to a kind of self-deception. It will be argued that none of these objections constitutes a serious threat to self-effacing moral theories as such.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.295-316, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

13

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This is a review essay on Daisuke Kachi's Agents: Contemporary Substance Ontology (sic. Shunjusha, 2018). The book develops and partially defends an ontology that takes the category of substance as the most fundamental one. The author provides in it a new perspective on substance, which consists in characterizing substances as bearers of what he calls “substance modalities” (of which there are four kinds, that stem from the factors of essence, power, past persistence, and future persistence respectively). The first part of this review essay gives an extended overview of Kachi's book while the second discusses some problems it may face.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.1, pp.83-86, 2014-07-30 (Released:2015-07-24)

被引用文献数

1 1

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, pp.155-169, 2012

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.61, pp.149-164_L9, 2010 (Released:2011-01-18)

参考文献数

10

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According to the widely accepted correspondence theory of truth, each atomic contingent truth has its own truth-maker, i.e., an entity existing in the world that makes contingent proposition true. And at least for the metaphysical realist, the first and obvious candidates for truth-maker are entities called “facts” or “states of affairs”. These are entities normally designated by expressions like “a's being F” or “the fact that a is F”.Although it seems natural to assume that states of affairs exist, there is a famous objection to this assumption, known as “Bradley's regress”. Roughly put, the objection proceeds as follows. The states of affairs are supposed to be complex entities. However, what accounts for the unity of constituents in the state of affairs, say, Fa? If one appeals to the exemplification relation E to bind the constituents a and F together, the explanatory job is not yet finished. For, in that case, the unity of a, F, and E now raises the same problem. It is no use to add further and further exemplification relations E', E'', E'''..., because each time one adds a new relation, one gets only a new explanatory task, and never the unity of a and F. Thus, since the unity of constituents cannot be accounted for, the assumption that states of affairs exist should be regarded as groundless.Against this objection, F. Orilia replies as follows. Though the regress objection above seems to seriously threaten the assumption that states of affairs exist, in fact it does not. For, the thought that there is an infinite explanatory sequence does not involve any inconsistency. As for myself, I agree with him as far as his last claim is concerned, namely the claim that there is no inconsistency in the idea of infinite explanatory sequence. However, I disagree with him as far as the evaluation of the regress objection is concerned. I claim that the alleged explanatory sequence generated in the regress objection is in fact vacant in its explanatory power, and hence that this objection in any way shows the failure of explanatory task.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.2, pp.2_115-2_134, 2011

被引用文献数

3

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&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;According to the &ldquo;truthmaker maximalism&rdquo;, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its <I>truthmaker</I>. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

慶應義塾大学

巻号頁・発行日

2012

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博士論文

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本現象学会

雑誌

現象学年報 (ISSN:0289825X)

巻号頁・発行日

no.30, pp.173-178, 2014

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

埼玉大学

雑誌

特別研究員奨励費

巻号頁・発行日

2011

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「唯名論を現代的な観点から彫琢し擁護する」という本研究の目的の達成に向け、平成25年度中に以下のような研究を行った。まず、博士論文の内容を発展させ、より包括的な議論に仕上げた。同論文では、「単純な述定命題のtruthmaker(この種の命題を真にするもの)」という理論的役割に注目し、この役割を果たす存在者は実在論の枠内(事態説)でよりも唯名論の枠内(トロープ説)でこそ満足な仕方で与えられると論じた。昨年度はこの議論を拡張し、truthmaker概念を採用することの動機づけをより丁寧に補強するとともに、従来この概念を採用することの一つの障壁とみなされていたスリングショット論法に応答する論考を加えた。以上の内容は、学術単著『真理から存在へ――<真にするもの>の形而上学』として近日出版予定である。また、現代形而上学の成果をドイツ・オーストリア学派の理解にフィードバックする一つの試みとして、現代形而上学における有力学説の一つである「性質の因果説」の見解を、特にE・フッサールが展開した性質・物体構成論を読み解くための手がかりとして用いることを試みた。その成果は、第12回フッサール研究会シンポジウムにおける提題として発表した。さらに、「実在論と唯名論」という理論的対立の基本に立ち返り、その意義をより広く非専門家に知らしめることを目指し、次の仕事も仕上げた。一つは、現代形而上学全般についての著作『ワードマップ現代形而上学』(新曜社、2014年)であり、この中で私は「普遍」「個物」「形而上学手のさらなる広がり」という三つの章の執筆を担当し、形而上学的対立を検討する一般的な意義とその方法について特に丁寧に紹介した。もう一つは、現代哲学において普遍の問題について論じるための必読文献となっているD. M. ArmstrongのUniversals : An Opinionated Introductionの翻訳であり、この中では詳細な訳注によって著者の議論を補足するとともに、この問題のそもそもの背景や争点についても解説した。