著者

相澤 康隆

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.60, pp.121-135_L8, 2009 (Released:2010-11-09)

参考文献数

19

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In Book 7 of his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle explains how a man can do what he knows to be wrong. Traditionally, Aristotle's account of akrasia is interpreted in this way: when someone acts from weakness of will, he doesn't know that what he does is wrong and that he should not do it. For example, when a diabetic eats something sweet because of his appetite, he doesn't know that he should not eat it.However, some objections have been made against this traditional interpretation. First, Aristotle seems to think that some akratic people know they should not do such and such (1150b19-22). If he thinks this, the traditional interpretation contradicts his text because on that interpretation an akratic person doesn't know he should not do such and such. Second, on the traditional interpretation there can be no conflict of motives. If an akratic person doesn't know he should not do such and such, he has no conflict between reason and appetite. However, it is quite clear to us that when we act from weakness of will, we have a conflict of motives.These objections can be answered by making few modifications to the traditional interpretation. It is true that an akratic person doesn't know at the time of his act that he should not do such and such. However, he knows it before he acts. If the traditional interpretation is modified in this way, the above objections can be answered. First, in 1150b19-22 Aristotle thinks some akratic people know before they act that they should not do such and such. Second, an akratic person does have a conflict of motives before he acts. He does have a conflict between reason and appetite before he acts, though at the time of his act he no longer has it.Making these modifications to the traditional interpretation, we can interpret Aristotle's account of akrasia consistently.