著者

渡辺 大地

出版者

日本哲学会

雑誌

哲学 (ISSN:03873358)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.55, pp.280-292,35, 2004-04-01 (Released:2009-07-23)

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In this paper, I want to discuss the so-called "Autonomy of Logic" (Logic must take care of itself)" in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein says that this remark is a very deep and fundamental insight, and a right interpretation of this insight will clarify what Wittgenstein means by "Logic" in the Tractatus. However, the remark's implications are very obscure, so some clarifications are necessary.The remark involves two points : in the whole theory of things, properties are superfluous, and we cannot make mistakes in logic. So I discuss these points and then interpret some remarks about the "Autonomy of Logic".Firstly, I discuss Peter Hacker's interpretation of these remarks and related points. I indicate some problems of his interpretation are due to his neglect of the view of nonsense in the Tractatus and I consider this problem on the basis of a new approach to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (especially the view of Cora Diamond and that of James Conant) and I then present an interpretation of the Autonomy of Logic.Secondly I deal with "the theory of correct symbolism" in Wittgenstein's early remarks, and clarify what he means by "Logic".