著者

真船 えり

出版者

慶應義塾大学

雑誌

哲學 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.103, pp.35-56, 1998-12

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1. はじめに2. 精神的実体と人格の同一性3. 人格の同一性についてのヒュームの問い4. 「附論」におけるヒュームの'迷路'5. おわりにIn A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 6, Hume presents his arguments on the issue of personal identity. In the previous section, he discussed the issue of the substance of the soul, assumed to be the a priori foundation of personal identity in those days. The purpose of this paper is to clarify one of Hume's intentions in discussing the problem of personal identity. This paper attempts to examine (1) the relationship between the notion of the substance of the soul and the problem of personal identity, (2) Hume's question about the problem of personal identity, and (3) the meaning of Hume's labyrinth of personal identity. In the course of examining these issues, it will be shown that Hume did not mean to deny the existence of the self when he called the notion of substance or personal identity 'fiction' in his arguments. Because Hume used the word 'fiction' in his own meaning, related with the imagination. Hume's programme is not the justification of the belief of personal identity, but an explanation of the origin of the notion. Further, Hume's labyrinth suggests, paradoxically, the hope of special treatment for the problem of personal identity.