- 著者
- 真船 えり
- 出版者
- 日本イギリス哲学会
- 雑誌
- イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.35, pp.69-84, 2012-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)
- 参考文献数
- 36
Hume distinguishes two cases of personal identity in the Treatise, one with regard to ʻour thought or imaginationʼ and the other with regard to ʻour passions or the concern we take in ourselvesʼ. First, I consider Humeʼs concept of character from the perspectives of durability and revisability. I propose to interpret Humeʼs ʻcharacterʼ as the habit of particular ways of forming beliefs from these perspectives. Then I examine the reasoning from character to actions, and the relation between moral judgment and necessity in voluntary actions. Finally I present Humeʼs framework of the link between person and character evaluated in terms of reciprocal relationships in human life. Through this investigation, I show that Hume discusses, though implicitly, the second case of personal identity in terms of the concept of character in the three books of the Treatise.
2 0 0 0 OA 脳死状態と蘇生限界
- 著者
- 真船 えり
- 出版者
- 科学基礎論学会
- 雑誌
- 科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.23, no.2, pp.85-90, 1996-03-31 (Released:2009-07-23)
- 参考文献数
- 33
2 0 0 0 OA ヒュームにおける心身問題について ―懐疑主義から自然主義へ―
- 著者
- 真船 えり
- 出版者
- 日本イギリス哲学会
- 雑誌
- イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.21, pp.5-19, 1998-04-01 (Released:2018-04-25)
This paper aims to clarify some of the intentions of Hume's arguments concerning the mind-body problem in his Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 5. It attempts to examine three main things: (1) the features of Hume's arguments compared with those of Locke; (2) Hume's own use of the words, such as ‘notion’, ‘fiction’ or ‘feign’, and ‘imagination’ or ‘fancy’; and (3) Hume's new method of explanation in terms of human nature on the problem concerning a conjunction of mind and body in place. In the course of these examinations, it will be shown that Hume's sceptical arguments suggest a new solution on the problem concerned, and lead to the naturalism, presented in the light of human nature.
2 0 0 0 OA ヒュームにおける人格の同一性について
- 著者
- 真船 えり
- 出版者
- 慶應義塾大学
- 雑誌
- 哲學 (ISSN:05632099)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.103, pp.35-56, 1998-12
1. はじめに2. 精神的実体と人格の同一性3. 人格の同一性についてのヒュームの問い4. 「附論」におけるヒュームの'迷路'5. おわりにIn A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 6, Hume presents his arguments on the issue of personal identity. In the previous section, he discussed the issue of the substance of the soul, assumed to be the a priori foundation of personal identity in those days. The purpose of this paper is to clarify one of Hume's intentions in discussing the problem of personal identity. This paper attempts to examine (1) the relationship between the notion of the substance of the soul and the problem of personal identity, (2) Hume's question about the problem of personal identity, and (3) the meaning of Hume's labyrinth of personal identity. In the course of examining these issues, it will be shown that Hume did not mean to deny the existence of the self when he called the notion of substance or personal identity 'fiction' in his arguments. Because Hume used the word 'fiction' in his own meaning, related with the imagination. Hume's programme is not the justification of the belief of personal identity, but an explanation of the origin of the notion. Further, Hume's labyrinth suggests, paradoxically, the hope of special treatment for the problem of personal identity.
1 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA ヒュームにおける心の問題について 『人間本性論』第1巻・第IV部・第5節を中心として
- 著者
- 真船 えり
- 出版者
- 日本科学哲学会
- 雑誌
- 科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.31, no.1, pp.53-68, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)
- 参考文献数
- 17
The subject of this paper is Hume's concept of mind, especially the arguments concerning the mind-body problem, in A Treatise of Human Nature, I, iv, 5. I will try to clarify the aspect of Hume's naturalism by showing that it aims to explain the human cognitive processes in terms of human nature. Hume's arguments on the cause of thought show that the relation between mind and body may be regarded as causal one, since the constant conjunction between objects constitutes the essence of their causal relations. It will be found through the examinations of the arguments that Hume's sceptical arguments are to introduce the naturalistic programmes.