著者
中村 正利
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.30, pp.93-106, 1997-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

This paper deals with Quine's "inscrutability of reference" thesis. In particular, I aim to examine Quine's two problematic claims about this thesis.The first is that reference is relative to a background language. The second claim is that inscrutability of reference extends to our own language, that is, reference is in-scrutable not only in the case of foreign languages but also of our own language. I shall argue that both these claims are untenable. To show the latter is untenable, I use Putnam's "brains in a vat" argument.
著者
中村 正利
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, no.1, pp.31-42, 2000-05-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

This paper deals with the question: what does Carnap's conventionalism consist in? As Quine points out, logic is needed for inferring logic from conventions. In the same way, in order to show that mathematics is true by convention, or to provide a justification for mathematics by convention, the very mathematics must be presupposed, as Godel puts it. So, the conventionalist claim that logic and mathematics are true or justified by convention must fail. Is this predicament not a problem for Carnap's conventionalism? I shall argue it is not, for his conventionalism does not aim at justification of logic and mathematics. It is what Carnap later called "explication" that he tries to undertake with his conventionalism.
著者
中村 正利
出版者
筑波大学哲学・思想学系
雑誌
哲学・思想論集 (ISSN:02867648)
巻号頁・発行日
no.27, pp.189-212, 2002-03-25

本論文では、「理論的には、それと経験的には等価であるが、論理的には両立不可能であるような、別の理論がある」というテーゼ(理論の決定不全性テーゼ)を検討したい。このテーゼは、クワインのいわゆる「ネガティヴ・テーゼ」のひとつである。 ...
著者
中村 正利
出版者
筑波大学哲学・思想学系
雑誌
哲学・思想論集 (ISSN:02867648)
巻号頁・発行日
no.26, pp.118-98, 2001-03-23 (Released:2013-12-18)
著者
中村 正利
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, no.1, pp.31-42, 2000

This paper deals with the question: what does Carnap's conventionalism consist in? As Quine points out, logic is needed for inferring logic from conventions. In the same way, in order to show that mathematics is true by convention, or to provide a justification for mathematics by convention, the very mathematics must be presupposed, as Godel puts it. So, the conventionalist claim that logic and mathematics are true or justified by convention must fail. Is this predicament not a problem for Carnap's conventionalism? I shall argue it is not, for his conventionalism does not aim at justification of logic and mathematics. It is what Carnap later called "explication" that he tries to undertake with his conventionalism.