著者

久保田 雅則

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_124-205_140, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

62

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The nuclear non-proliferation norm, or the limitation on the number of nuclear weapon states, has been institutionalized in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) centered regime. It is notable that the 25 years term limitation of the treaty was extended indefinitely and the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection system strengthened in spite of the unfairness of the treaty. Why then, was the non-proliferation norm institutionalized in such a strong regime beyond the merely ideological norm?Existing research points to the Great Powers preference and/or civil society movements as the factors behind the norm institutionalization. In contrast, this paper focuses on the norm violations and presents a hypothesis that the norm violations prompted the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm. Specifically, the norm violations, that is, possession of nuclear weapons, gave policy makers accurate information about the costs and effects of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, many states who renounced nuclear weapon possession created the strong regime in order to bind other potential norm violators.The theoretical kernel of this argument is the uncertainty of the costs and effects of nuclear weapons. Many policy makers were not well-informed about the effects and costs after the first atomic bomb was introduced. This discouraged policy makers from planning nuclear weapon policies, then dampened their resolve to establish the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Against this background, nuclear non-proliferation norm violations, that is, new nuclear weapon possessors emerged, which reduced the uncertainty around the nuclear weapons and decisively influenced the institutionalization of the nuclear non-proliferation norm.This paper derived the hypothesis from theoretical consideration. Policy makers faced a range of uncertainties regarding nuclear weapons, including deterrent effect, costs, international relations, and normative behavior of other states. These played a role in their decisions regarding compliance with the norm. The uncertainties of nuclear weapons are reduced and the policy makers clearly recognize the costs and effects of nuclear weapons when the nuclear non-proliferation norm violations occurred. Almost all policy makers renounce possession of nuclear weapons because of their relatively high costs. They then want to bind others to abandon the aspiration for nuclear weapons. Hence it follows that a strict institution is created.The sections which follow the theoretical consideration empirically verify the above hypothesis. The third section posits that no violations led a weak institution, that is to say the 1968 NPT. The fourth section shows that the policy makers who became informed about the costs and effects of nuclear weapons by norm violations, renounced possession of nuclear weapons and strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime to bind other states.

著者

中野 義昭 種村 拓夫 杉山 正和 小関 泰之 肥後 昭男 久保田 雅則

出版者

東京大学

雑誌

特別推進研究

巻号頁・発行日

2014

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(1) 量子井戸型偏波制御器の設計と試作前年度に開発した量子井戸型偏波制御器の高速化と省電力化を図るために, 逆バイアス駆動により量子閉じ込めシュタルク効果を用いた変調素子を試作実証した. 並行して, さらなる高性能化に向けて量子構造の最適化を進めている.(2) 偏波解析素子の設計と試作前年度に作製した量子井戸型受光素子を搭載した完全にモノリシックな集積回路を評価し, ポアンカレ球面上の任意の偏波状態を検出できることを実証した. さらに, 高感度化に向けて, 4ポート構成を新たに提案し, 素子パラメータの設計を完了した. 現在, 4ポート素子の作製を進めている.(3) 光波合成チップの設計と試作前年度に提案したランダム信号を用いた駆動手法を大規模光波合成チップに適用し, その有効性を実験的に検証した. 同時に, 2次元化に向けて, 回折格子カプラを集積した素子の試作を行った. これらの素子の応用の一つとして, 2次元イメージング実験を進めている.(4) ユニタリ変換チップの設計前年度に作製した3×3ユニタリ変換チップを用いて, 任意光ユニタリ変換機能を実験的に検証した. 並行して, 作製誤差に対して耐性のある新規構造の素子を完成させ, 評価を進めている.