著者

倉科 一希

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.204, pp.204_1-204_16, 2021-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

55

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How do alliance partners treat the problem of credibility of extended deterrence when they understand seriousness of security threats differently? Do they continue negotiations on the measures to confirm credibility? If so, why? To study this problem, this paper examines US policies toward nuclear sharing when France challenged NATO and shook US-European relations since World War II.France withdrew from the military organization of NATO when nuclear sharing and the stationing costs of the US/British troops on the European continent also troubled the alliance. The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson treated them as parts of a large problem. Washington also tried to solve these related problems through closer cooperation of the United States, the British, and the West Germans. This tripartitism (or trilateralism) was the basic framework through which the Johnson administration considered the ways to deal with individual problems in NATO.Nuclear sharing was not only a part of tripartitism but also a means to promote it. At least by the end of 1964, the respective US governments regarded nuclear sharing as the major way to secure credibility of extended deterrence and, as a result, to hold the alliance together. This attitude changed, however, by the beginning of 1966 when the Johnson administration seriously studied the France-NATO problem and the troop stationing costs. By constructing a nuclear consultation mechanism based on US-UK-FRG cooperation, Washington expected to introduce tripartitism into NATO.The problem of the US/British troop stationing costs grew tense in the middle of the same year. The Johnson administration tried to persuade Bonn to bear more costs of these costs, and this burden-sharing was expected to be a part of tripartitism. Washington tried to introduce a burden-sharing mechanism into NATO in face of the French challenge. President Johnson particularly considered a deal with Bonn over nuclear sharing and the troop costs problem, and this became clear in unofficial US-Soviet talks over the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Johnson insisted on sustaining the possibility of a common strategic nuclear force despite Soviet rejection of any common strategic nuclear force with FRG participation. Here Johnson expected to open this option of a common nuclear force to encourage Bonn’s acceptance of larger burden to support US/British forces.This paper shows that a nuclear sharing measure played a role in inter-allies’ negotiations even though its prime purpose, securing credibility of US extended deterrence, grew less relevant. This perspective could enhance our understanding of nuclear issues under a less tense international situation.

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.118-122, 2019-12-31 (Released:2022-03-14)

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.134, pp.42-55,L9, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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This article discusses the development of the Junktim between East-West disarmament/arms control negotiations and German reunification and the changes in American policies regarding the Junktim under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It argues that the United States government at that time changed the Junktim in order to make current disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union possible. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not enforce the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to abandon the latter's objection to the issues relating to European security and to accept the US policy changes in these matters.The Junktim was established as a US policy and as a common Western policy in 1955-56. The Eisenhower administration had inherited a policy of the Junktim from the previous administration. Discussions about US disarmament/arms control policies before and after the Geneva four-power summit meeting in July 1955 reconfirmed this policy with the support of all major members of the administration, including Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. The major Western allies had agreed to a Junktim between European security and German reunification before the Geneva summit meeting, but the British, the French and the West Germans soon found themselves divided regarding the definition of this Junktim. US efforts to close the gap among Europeans led to agree another Junktim between German reunification and arms reduction by stages as an allied position in May 1956.The Eisenhower administration tried to change the Junktim in order to widen the range of discussions with the Soviets. First, Stassen tried to define the first stage of an arms reduction proposal which would be implemented without progress toward German reunification. After Stassen's failure in 1957 and departure in the next year, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opened a way to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets and the British without discussing German reunification. After a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in November 1958, President Eisenhower and the newly appointed Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, connected nuclear test ban negotiations with Berlin negotiations in order to improve prospects of the latter.These US efforts upset Bonn, but Washington did not totally neglect Bonn's concerns. First, Washington modified the Junktim but did not abandon its principle. Second, Bonn's objection against accepting European security measures without progress toward reunification was recognized by the Eisenhower administration.Washington's effort to modify the Junktim indicates its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and its desire not to destroy the alliance with the FRG. This study shows the second half of the 1950s as a dynamic period of the Cold War and gives a hint that can explain the developments in the following decades.

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

一橋大学

雑誌

一橋法学 (ISSN:13470388)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, no.3, pp.1167-1193, 2003-11-10

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論文タイプ||論説

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

広島市立大学

雑誌

若手研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2010

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本研究は、1960年代のケネディおよびジョンソン政権に着目し、アメリカの対西ヨーロッパ政策を、通商問題を中心にしつつ、政治・安全保障問題との関係にも注意を払いながら検討した。当該時期には、ヨーロッパ統合をめぐって西ヨーロッパ諸国が対立していたこともあり、通商政策が大きく動いたとは言えない。その一方で、アメリカの政治・安全保障政策とヨーロッパ統合との密接な関係が確認された。