- 著者
-
太田 裕信
- 出版者
- 西田哲学会
- 雑誌
- 西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.9, pp.78-95, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)
Many scholars such as Shizuteru Ueda and Ryousuke Ōhashi have insisted that Nishida’s philosophy has a close affinity with the work of Heidegger. However, there have been few comparisons drawn between them. The reason for this is that Nishida’s criticism of Heidegger is rather obscure and difficult to understand. In this paper, therefore, I want to explain his criticism of Heidegger and examine its validity, which will in turn make clear the essence of Nishida’s philosophy.
The most important issue is the affinity and difference between their philosophical principles, as it is, a comprehension of being(Seinsverständnis) and self-awaking(Jikaku). In Self-awaking-determination of Nothingness, Nishida criticized Heidegger’s idea of “comprehension” as an incomplete idea of “self-awareness”. This issue relates to the concept of time and otherness. Nishida’s idea of time which he terms “self-determination of the Eternal Now” bears resemblance to Heidegger’s temporality(Zeitlichkeit), however, Nishida criticized Heidegger from his perspective of time which is grounded in his idea of otherness.
Although there are many similarities between Heidegger and Nishida, we should acknowledge the important differences between “Seinsverständnis” and “Jikaku”. If we come to compare them more profoundly, we can see a picture of a concrete ontology of self which transcends the limitations of specific cultural frameworks.