著者
杉之原 真子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_45-205_60, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
60

This study aims to shed light on the reality of economic statecraft under the Trump administration by examining the formation of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018. For effective economic statecraft, the state as a unitary actor need to set a clear goal and pursue it in a concerted manner. Does this assumption hold in economic policymaking, where conflicting interests often collide?FIRRMA is primarily aimed to restrict China’s access to U.S. technology in order to contain the country’s rapid technological development. It is an effort to use American economic power to maintain US hegemony by limiting the operation of Chinese companies on the US soil, especially in the high-tech industries. At first glance, the bill seems to have been passed smoothly with a bipartisan support in Congress and with the full approval of the legislative branch, both of which came to take increasingly hardline stance toward China. They did so without being pushed by the public opinion or economic interests of their constituencies. This can be interpreted as a case in which policymakers came together to exercise economic statecraft in order to protect “national interest” in the face of the rising China threat, as Neorealism predicts.However, a close examination of the preferences and motives of each actor involved in the policymaking process reveals that the U.S. hardline policy toward China on inward investment was based on a combination of various motives and conditions. As there exists no firm consensus within the U.S. authority on detailed goals, it is highly likely that China’s actions or changes in the U.S. economic situation will lead to a loss of policy unity. It also shows the fundamental weakness of the foundation of economic statecraft, as economic policies usually involve a wide range of interests and preferences.In the long run, the strengthening of regulations on foreign investment could weaken the U.S. economic power, which is the base of its hegemony. Therefore, the case of regulations on inward investment also highlights such double-edged nature of economic statecraft: overuse of economic power can undermine the very source of power.
著者
杉之原 真子
出版者
日本政治学会
雑誌
年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.1, pp.1_36-1_56, 2017

<p>近年、モノの貿易だけでなく海外直接投資 (FDI) が経済グローバル化の重要な要素となった。1990年代以降は新興国からの投資が増大し、国内企業が持つ技術の流出や外国企業による市場の支配に関して、安全保障面から懸念も持たれている。経済成長につながる外資の誘致と、安全保障に配慮した規制の適切なバランスをとることは、各国で重要な政治的課題となっている。本稿では、2000年代半ば以降多くの先進国で新たな規制が導入されたことに着目し、米国と日本の事例を比較して、政策決定システムの違いが両国の政策決定に大きな影響を与えたと論じる。米国では議会主導で、外国企業による戦略的産業の買収を広範に規制する法律が制定されたが、その過程では、外国企業の買収を経済的理由から阻止したい他の企業が安全保障上の懸念を利用したことが、議会の外資脅威論を喚起した。一方日本では、官僚主導の審議会による漸進的な規制強化が行われたが、そのアジェンダ設定には敵対的買収への対抗策を設けたい経済団体が影響を及ぼしていた。</p>