文献一覧: 松本正夫 (著者)

4 0 0 0 OA 「存在の類比」の形而上学的意義

著者: 松本正夫
出版者: 慶應義塾大学
雑誌: 哲學 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.41, pp.1-47, 1961-12

Relying upon the existence-experience of regions of matter, life and mind, and using the analogy of proportionality of essences, I explained the conception of their essences and categories, Thus I arrived at the standpoint of analogical universal which transcends particular regions of beings. On this basis we get the regional metaphysics about the world in general. As we consider the essence of world as relative being and the essence of God as absolute being in the proof of God's existence, and by using the analogy of proportionality of existences, proportioned to each essence, we arrive at the standpoint of transcendental wholeness, ens commune sive analogicum, in which the absolute being and the relative being can coexist. Here we get metaphysics, i.e. ontology which treats not only regional beings in the world, but also the absolute being as its object. If ens commune sive analogicum, which covers both the absolute and the relative were itself an objective being, it would have to be another world, containing God and the world, where the God can not retain His absoluteness and becomes a mere relative being. So in order that, without loosing their "thing in itselfness", the absolute and the relative might still relate with each other in their coexistence, ens commune sive analogicum should not be universal in object but universal in function. Kitaro Nishida's place-universal and the voidness in Mahayana thought are the equivalents for that. This is an excessus from the absolute itsself and "diffusivum sui" of God. God establishes ens commune sive analogicum "the place" which is not aliquid in any sense i.e. nothing, or voidness, by throwing His pure act of actual existing upon not-existence; thus His pure act leaves behind all sorts of essences and even His own essence of the absolute i.e. the existence itself. This is the only place where the absolute and the relative can coexist. In His nature God has ens universale which can cause every creature but can only have ens commune sive analogicum as "the place" of Himself and His creature in habitus of creation. On one hand in ens commune God makes creatures coexist with Himself, still in the full possession of His absoluteness and on the other hand the mind of creature must expand (dilatare) itsself by ens commune in its habitus, though in its nature it remains finite and relative. "anima quodammodo omnia fit." For man, it is possible to meet the absolute as "you" in its transcendental itsselfness, and mot in any shade of idolatry only when he makes his mind-structure coincide with voidness of "the place", that can be realized in acquired habitus but never in its apriori nature.

2021-07-20 00:54:30
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3 0 0 0 OA 汝性の条件としての物自体性について : 愛の条件としての汝性について(小林澄兄先生古稀記念論文集)

著者: 松本正夫
出版者: 慶應義塾大学
雑誌: 哲學 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日: vol.34, pp.149-178, 1958-01

小林澄兄先生古稀記念論文集Since the translation of "The Mind and Heart of Love", a work by Rev. M.C. D'Arcy, was recently published, I tried to give a sort of comment and criticism on the several subjects I pickcd up from it. According to modern subjectivism, thing in itself is denied and thing as such is considered nothing else but an objectivation or projection of a central subject, in a word, it becomes merely a certain mode of subject itself. In such German idealism, just like in oriental monism, all is ego though it does recognize the difference between small and big ego and there is no room for the true existence of thouness. Thing in itself is exactly what the category of substance signified in the traditional philosophy and it occupied a highly estimated position in the field though modern philosophy lowered and dismissed it. Substance means simply that a thing is identical with itself solely by itself without any help from the other and does not mean necessarily that a thing is immutable and incorruptible in its essence. It is an assurance that some things can keep their own subjectivity in a perfect independence from conscious subject or ego. Therefore thing in itself is a necessary presupposition of thouness. It is said that true love exists between "I and you", not between "I and it". However even in the case of "I and it", "it" is not a merely projection of "I", "it" really transcends me as a thing in itself. In the case of "I and you", "you" transcends me as a thing in itself; yet here "you" is not only "in itself" but also "for itself", and so "you" is a subject (a mind) just like "I". Considering the difference between Eros and Agape, it is commonly admitted that Eros is self-immanent-love and Agape is self-transcendent-love. I am opposed to this doctrine and wish to say that the former is a love for man and the latter is a love for God. And in these cases of (1) thing-love (if admitted to say so) and (2) man-love and (3) god-love, both that self-immanent-love and that self-transcendent-love always coexist but in some different degrees as follows. In the case of (1) the former must be more and the latter less, in the case of (2) the former and the latter are almost equal in amount and in the case of (3) the former must be quite less and the latter must be the most part. This self-immanent-love is compared to animus, that is, the masculine character and this self-transcendent-love to anima, that is, the feminine character. According to Rev. D'Arcy, the former is further considered as an essential ego and the latter as an existential ego and humanism corresponds to the former and mysticism to the latter. Against this conclusion I suggested that there is no real division between both egos and their operations are mostly done together. So in a long run they must be considered one. Thus I emphasized the roll which animus takes in mysticism when not only anima but also animus, that is, the whole ego is overwhelmed by the gift from above. In the end I argued against Rev. D'Arcy's voluntarism which claims the immanent character of reason and the transcendent character of will, with the intellectualism which, to my analysis, depends on the fact of transcendency of reason and of immanency of will.