著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.85-106, 2017-12-20 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

21

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A new way of interpreting or approaching Wittgenstein’s remarks on following rules in Philosophical Investigations will be introduced. The notion of “family resemblance” will be claimed to play a central role in Wittgenstein’s views on what our concepts are, and therefore on what it is to employ them. By way of illustrating his views on concepts, I will appeal to certain models of concept and classification from psychology and machine learning. Wittgenstein’s fundamental remarks on following rules will be presented as natural consequences of his views on the nature of our concepts.

著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.35-51, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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This paper deals with the question of how one could understand the difference between Frege's notion of thought and Russell's notion of proposition. After briefly discussing how one could make sense of Russell's so-called Gray's elegy argument and its relevance to Frege's notion of indirect sense, I will introduce Kaplan's solution to Russell's argument, and try to explain its significance by appealing to a puzzle raised by Kaplan in connection to his notion of valuated sentence. At the end of the paper, I will claim that the most striking feature of Russell's singular propositions as compared with Frege's thoughts is not that they may contain concrete things, but that they are not meant as representations to begin with.

著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.2, pp.119-132, 2000-11-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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It has been widely assumed, arguably under the influence of Tarski's Convention T, that in giving a truth-theoretic semantics for a language one has to employ a metalanguage that can express whatever is expressible in the object language. In this note I will present some cases against this assumption. The requirement that every expression in the object lan-guage be translatable into the metalanguage should not be considered compulsory, it will be argued, when the object language contains expressions like indexicals, empty singular terms, and vague words. An attempt will be made to draw some philosophical morals from this contention.

著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, pp.155-167, 1996-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

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In this note I examine the criticism of Quine's "Two Dogmas" given by Crispin Wright in his "Inventing Logical Necessity". Wright claims, in opposition to Quine, that certain metalogical statements are indeed immune to revision. Without committing myself to Quine's position, I show that Wright's argument is flawed since (1) he overlooks the indispensable role of intuitive reasoning in metalogic, and (2) even if the acceptance of a metalogical statement is presupposed in the test of a certain theory, it does not follow that the very same metalogical statement must be presupposed whenever we put a theory into empirical test.

著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

首都大学東京都市教養学部人文・社会系

雑誌

人文学報 (ISSN:03868729)

巻号頁・発行日

no.429, pp.1-24, 2010-03