著者
樋渡 展洋
出版者
東京大学
雑誌
基盤研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
2020-04-01

本研究の目的は、通説的な選挙制度改革が日本の政党変容を規定したという政治制度的理解に代わって、新たに政治経済的解釈を提示し、それを実証することにある。その要諦は、現在の状況を、政策競合政治への変容過程での一党優位支配と規定し、その原因を経済停滞下、有権者の信託を得た経済政策課題の解決の必要性に対する自民、民主両党の脱皮度の違いに求めている。政権党の経済改革の必要性は、各党内において成長指向路線と地域利益配分指向との対立を激化させ、そのことが激震的な選挙変動を媒介に、自民党と民主党では非対称的な適応性に帰結した、というものである。
著者
樋渡 展洋
出版者
JAPANESE POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
雑誌
年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.59, no.2, pp.2_182-2_216, 2008 (Released:2012-12-28)
参考文献数
53

The United States responded to the end of the Cold War by promoting trade with regimes that adopted market-oriented reforms but investing in weapons development to maintain superiority over non-democratizing military powers. This policy was sustained in Congress in spite of majority Party changes, divided government, and economic swings. This article constructs a framework that incorporates Presidential agenda setting, partisan debates over control of the agenda, and ideological overlap between the parties to identify the lawmakers behind this policy. This framework builds on Tsebelis’ veto player theory, which includes both institutional veto points and partisan veto players, and predicts voting patterns that differ from Krehbiel's pivotal politics model (focusing exclusively on institutional veto points), Cox and McCubbins’ partisan agenda model (examining only partisan veto players), or the two presidency thesis (emphasizing Presidential agenda setting). The framework is then applied to understand Congressional foreign policy voting patterns. An analysis of Congressional bills and resolutions on China trade, defense spending, and missile defense spending shows voting patterns that are in line with the predictions from this framework, rather than existing models and suggests that stable support for the above policy comes from a bipartisan, pro-business, and President-supportive group of lawmakers.